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China, 960–1127 
Kent G. Deng1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Northern Song Period (960–1127) has been recognised as one of the most important 
eras in China’s economic and demographic history. This study investigates climatic and 
geopolitical conditions and factors that led to economic restructuring whereby intensive 
growth took place to generate more wealth to support a growing population. This paper 
reveals the unique nature and mechanisms behind the Song remarkable economic growth 
with quantitative evidence.  
 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Dr. Lucy Zheng who has helped with the quantitative part of this paper. My deep 
indebtedness goes to Professors Eric L. Jones, Patrick O’Brien, Stephen Broadberry, Janet Hunter, Mark 
Elvin, Bruce Campbell and Bozhong Li, who commented and advised on various drafts over the last three 
years. 
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The mainstream scholarship on Song China has regarded the Northern Song (960–1127) 
as a period of ‘economic revolution’ with which China demonstrated a clear tendency towards 
intensive growth.2 Other opinions account for a small minority.3 There has been a range of 
influential works in Western literature by Robert Hartwell,4 Shiba Yoshinobu,5 Mark Elvin, Joel 
Mokyr and Kenneth Pomeranz.6 Eric Jones thus argued that Song China was the first credible 
candidate for a genuine industrial revolution centuries before any other civilisation.7 His 
provoking question ‘why China was unable to repeat its Song success’ has formulated an 
intriguing paradox.  
Amongst Chinese academics, however, the Northern Song Period has not been 
celebrated quite the same way. In the Chinese collective memory, the Northern Song Period 
was marred by administrative weakness and military incompetence that led to repeated defeats 
with two emperors captured as prisoners of war and annual ransoms payable to nomads 
(Huizong, r. 1100–25; Qinzong, r. 1125–7), and then alien conquests of China. Even so, there 
has been a strong undercurrent in China to re-assess the Song economic performance.8 But the 
Song paradox of advanced industry and commerce coinciding with pathetic national defence 
has never failed to provoke debate.9  
                                                 
2 On the Song industrial sector, see Hartwell, ‘Iron and Coal Industries’, ‘Economic Change’, Iron and 
Early Industrialism and ‘Markets, Technology, and the Structure of Enterprise’. More recently, Wagner, 
‘Administration of the Iron Industry’. On Song commerce, see Shiba, Commerce and Society; Elvin, 
Pattern of the Chinese Past, Pt. 2. On Song technology, see Needham, Science and Civilisation; Deng, 
Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development; Mokyr, Lever of Riches, ch. 8; Von Glahn, 
Fountain of Fortune; Twitchett and Smith, Cambridge History of China, vol. 5, Part One; Qi, Songdai 
Jingjishi, vol. 2, chs 13, 18, 19, 28.  
3 Some have questioned the existence of the Song growth; see e.g. Landes, Wealth and Poverty, ch. 21. 
4 Hartwell, ‘Iron and Coal Industries’, ‘Economic Change’, Iron and Early Industrialism and ‘Markets, 
Technology, and the Structure of Enterprise’. Noted here, most estimates have been based on 5.7 million 
piculs of iron (or 3,400 metric tons) received by the Song state in 1078; see Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, 
‘Shihou 33/3–4, 33/27–9’. Hartwell’s estimate of the Song annual iron output (114,000 metric tones) has 
not been short of debate; see e.g. Wagner ‘Administration of the Iron Industry’, p. 176 and his Science 
and civilisation in China, p. 300; Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 559–61; Liu, ‘Songdaide Tieqian Yu Tie 
Chanliang’; Wang, Songdai Kuangye Yanjiu, pp. 159–74; Yoshida, Chugoku Kagaku Gijutsu Shi Ronshu, 
pp. 364–6. General speaking, Hartwell and Wagner operate on the supply side of the industry; Qi, Liu 
and Wang on the demand side. In his most recent re-assessment, Wagner concluded that Hartwell’s 
figures were ‘of the right general order of magnitude’; see his Science and civilisation in China, p. 280. 
Others believe that Hartwell overestimated the Song capacity. Liu’s estimate is 10,000 metric tonnes; Qi-
Wang’s, about 70,000; Yoshida, somewhere in between.  
5 Shiba, Commerce and Society.  
6 Elvin called it ‘the Medieval Revolution’; see his Pattern of the Chinese Past, Pt. 2; Mokyr, Lever of 
Riches; Pomeranz, Great Divergence. 
7 Jones, European Miracle, p. 160; Jones, Growth Recurring, ch. 4; Jones, ‘Real Question about China’. 
Also, Hobson, Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, chs 1–4, 9. 
8 E.g. Yuan, ‘Local Government Schools’; Shi, Beisong Shiqi Ziran Zaihai Yu Zhengfu Guanli Tixi Yanjiu; Qi, 
Songdai Jingjishi; Wu, Songdai Jingjishi Yanjiu; Liu, Songjin Zhibishi; Cheng, Songdai Wujia Yanjiu; Gao, 
Songdai Huobi Yu Houbi Liutong Yanjiu. For a comprehensive review, see Zhu and Cheng, Songshi Yanjiu. 
Also, see Songshi Yanjiu Ji, a long-lasting research series published in Taiwan from 1958 to 1984 which 
contains short essays on all aspects of Song history. 
9  Many civilisations were defeated by nomads from the Steppes around this time, China was no 
exception. But, Song China had serious internal defects. The Northern Song was established through a 
military coup d'état by Zhao Kuangyin (927–76) who later became paranoid about coup against himself. 
 5 
Nevertheless, one view shared by both Western and Chinese literatures is that the 
Northern Song Period was marked by its rapid population growth.10 The main evidence comes 
from officially registered household numbers, which grew from 6.2 million households in 980 
AD to 17.5 million households by 1101 AD, an increase of 280 per cent.11 This was monitored 
by regular surveys (with 1–3 year intervals), including dingzhang (male poll), dingchan bu 
(household asset assessment), shui zhang (household tax accounts), xiaqiu shui zhang (two 
seasonal tax accounts), and baojia bu (neighbourhood watch enrolment).12 During the previous 
Tang Period (618–907), nation-wide surveys were only conducted four times in total.13 This 
made the Song Period information-richer than any of its predecessors.  
But so far, the actual population number of the Song (in persons) has remained 
unknown. Of 45 available observations from 960 to 1127, kou or dingkuo (meaning ‘male 
persons’ and ‘male poll-taxpayers’) varied from 1.42 to 2.57 per household, averaging 2.11.14 
This male bias in population registration was deliberate. It all began in 963 when the newly 
crowned Emperor Taizhu (r. 960–76) decided to exclude the entire female population from the 
government taxation registrations.15 One therefore should not take these numbers as the 
actual sizes of Song households simply because such small family sizes would have made Song 
population unsustainable.  
Sporadically, local family sizes were unveiled under certain extraordinary circumstances 
such as during famine when every soul was counted. Of over 400,000 locally registered relief 
beneficiary households, the average household had 5.3–5.5 persons.16 Or, one can use the 
Tang demography as a proxy, since the Tang Marriage Law was followed,17 and the geographic 
concentration of population remained more or less unchanged.18 However, scholars still have 
                                                                                                                                                        
He implemented a cluster of measures to separate military commanders from their troops and hence 
undermined the strength of the Song national defence which cancelled the Song advantages in military 
technology (including the world’s first compass and fire arms); see Deng, Chinese Premodern Economy, 
ch. 6. The system backfired after military leaders lost interest in the quality of troops. Army recruits were 
made of the ‘undesirable and untrustworthy’, i.e. beggars, ruffians, riffraff and bandits. Discipline was 
gone and mutinies were common; see Luo, Songshi Pieshi, pp. 3–58. As a result, of the 81 military 
clashes with the Khitans, the Songs triumphed only once; see Hua, Songshi Luji, p. 142. A lousy military 
was undoubtedly an Achilles’ heel of the Song Empire. 
10 For Western works, see e.g. Durand, ‘Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2–1953’, pp. 227–8; Chao, 
Man and Land in Chinese History; Deng, “Unveiling China’s True Population Statistics”. 
11 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 164; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 122–35. 
12 Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 54; Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, pp. 
229–30; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoshi, pp. 59–62. 
13 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 78–114. 
14 Ibid., pp. 122–4. Similarly, see He, Songdai Xiaofei Shi, p. 308, where the average household size 
‘declined’ from 2.2 to 1.7 persons. For the on-going debate, see Zhu and Cheng, Songshi Yanjiu, pp. 
248–56. 
15 The emperor instruction reads: ‘Local governments report the number of men from Age 20 until Age 
60; women are excluded’, cited in Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, p. 255; see 
also Wu, Zhongguo Renkoshi, pp. 66–7.  
16 Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 156, 159. 
17 The legal ages for marriages were 15 for males and 13 for females during the Tang and the Northern 
Song; see Jiang, Renkou Yu Lishi, p. 272. 
18 Population Census Office and the Institute of Geography, Population Atlas, pp. 70–1.  
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no agreed size for Song households.19 The variation may in fact reflect the Song regional 
demographic differences.20 To avoid further controversy, the current study sticks to the official 
household numbers instead of making yet another set of population estimates (see Table 1).21  
Given that difference in growth rates between households and male poll-taxpayers is 
negligible. For the purpose of this research, one per cent a year can be taken as a proxy for the 
population growth per se. An independent check is available to support this growth rate. 
According to the government record, from 995 to 1078 the Songs total marketed salt increase 
from 373,545 xiaoxi (small units) to 739,620 daxi (large units), or from 43.5 million to 103.5 
million catties, with an annual growth rate of one per cent.22 Salt consumption is both price 
and income inelastic. It is a reliable barometer for population growth. 
The question is what made a persistent increase in the Song population possible. One 
popular explanation is that the Song population grew on a cheaper food source known as the 
‘Champa Rice Hypothesis’. It asserts that a new rice species introduced from outside 
teleologically multiplied China’s food stock on the one hand, and population, and industry and 
commerce on the other.23 This is commonly associated with the ‘surplus-pulled’ model. The 
problem with this cheap food hypothesis is why a windfall of cheap food did so little for China’s 
industry and commerce during the Ming-Qing Period later. Historically, more food often meant 
more pleasure instead of more work in industry. Also due to the price and income inelasticity in 
food consumption, more food does not create more market value or greater capital 
accumulation and capital formation. Quite the opposite: cheap food always harms farmers. 
Historically, therefore, a low market price itself was always sufficient to discourage excessive 
supply of food to last for too long. So, the ‘Champa Rice Hypothesis’ is self-defeating. 
There is also a ‘subsistence-pushed’ model which operates differently: when per capita 
farmland shrinks too much to live on home-grown staple food, producers are forced to produce 
non-staple products in order to sell them in exchange for food to consume, often at the 
subsistence level. In doing so, population may still increase but per capita income often does 
not, called ‘rural involution’.24 In this context, much of the growth was fuelled by Chayanovian 
‘labour self-exploitation’ within a frozen production possibility frontier.25 To satisfy this 
‘subsistence-pushed’ model however, the supply of arable land must be inelastic. This seems to 
be the case in later Qing but not during the Northern Song. If land supply was elastic, as in 
                                                 
19 The highest estimate is 7.5 people; the lowest, 5.0; the medium, 5.4–6.0. For a high estimate see Li, 
‘Songmo Zhi Mingchu Jiangnan Nongmin Jingyingde Bianhua’, p. 33. For a low one, see Wu, Zhongguo 
Renkoushi, p. 580; Jiang, Population and History, p. 60; Duan, Historical Demography, p. 335. For the 
medium range; see Ge, Zhongguo Renkou Fazhanshi, p. 308; Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide 
Jiliang Yanjiu, pp. 253–63; Ma, ‘Family Size’. 
20 Wang, Jindai Zhongguo Wujia, Gongzi He Shenghuo Shuiping Yanjiu, pp. 174–8. 
21 We are fully aware of the story of lazy county magistrates forging local records in the late Qing; see 
Skinner, “Sichuan’s Population in the Nineteenth Century”. So far, there has been no similar complaint 
against the Song administration. The ‘Skinnerian data problem’ may have not been widespread during 
the Northern Song. 
22 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 181, ‘Shihuozhi 134’. Note: xiaoxi = 116.5 catties; daxi = 140 catties. 
23 Ho, ‘Early-Ripening Rice’, p. 212.  
24 For Ming-Qing North China, see Huang, Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China. For 
medieval England, see Campbell, ‘Agrarian Problem in the Early Fourteen Century’. 
25 Chayanov, Theory of Peasant Economy. 
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China from 1000 throughout 1750, home-grown food was able to feed the family; then, the 
majority farmers did not need to trade for food. 
Among Song scholars, opinions have been divided. Followers of the ‘surplus-pulled’ 
hypothesis include Qi Xia who develops a long list of advancements in Song agriculture for 
cheap food.26 Among the sceptics like Li Bozhong and Zeng Xiongsheng doubts are raised 
about a food windfall.27 They tend to favour a subsistence-pushed explanation.  
An alternative model is ‘diversified income’, meaning that there are opportunities to earn 
more income differently, something close to Arthur Lewis’ dualism with which a higher income 
option available ex ante persuades people to change jobs across sectors voluntarily without the 
pain of the Enclosure Movement or class struggle.28 It fits well with “Say’s Law” of products 
being paid for by each other, and the market always clearing itself, an idea that has inspired 
many great works on modern growth.29 Then, more incomes lead to a growth in population in 
a virtuous spiral. To achieve that, the economy needs to have a structure that is different from a 
traditional farming society. This study argues that during the Northern Song China was such an 
economy where economic restructuring occurred, offering diversified opportunities to make a 
living outside the farming sector. Diverse incomes in turn supported an increase in population. 
This paper has thus three objectives: first, to investigate the causes and mechanisms of the 
economic restructuring and development during the Northern Song; second, to measure the 
impact of such development on population growth; and third, to provide systematic empirical 
evidence generated from quantitative modelling. 
This paper is organised as follows: in the wake of this current introduction section, 
Section I discusses historical information available in general. Section II analyses the causes and 
mechanisms of the economic restructuring and development during the Northern Song Period. 
Section III discusses data and variables, constructs a quantitative model for empirical analysis, 
and discusses the findings. Section IV draws the final conclusion. 
 
I 
 
Granted, all the data from historical sources are far from fool-proof due to human errors 
and the rep-tape. But modern estimates and ‘guesstimates’ are not fool-proof, either. The 
former deserve the benefit of the doubt, to say the least. Information-wise, this study thus 
depends on available Song official and private sources. Official sources available are 
predominantly Song Shi (History of the Song Dynasty) and Song Huiyao Jigao (Edited 
Administrative Statutes of the Song Dynasty). Modern compilations of historical accounts such 
as Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji (Dynastic Data for China’s Households, Cultivated 
Land and Land Taxation) serve as a back-up since they include information extracted from other 
works such as state crafts like Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian (Enlarged Comprehensive 
                                                 
26 See Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, chs 1–3.  
27 Li, Xuanjing, Jicui Yu Songdai Jiangnan Nongye Geming’; Zeng, ‘Songdaide Shuangji Dao’. 
28 Lewis, ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’. 
29 E.g. Braudel, Wheels of Commerce. 
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References for State Management) and Wenxian Tongkao (Comprehensive Study of Historical 
Records). Private accounts are also consulted such as Qimin Yaoshu (Essential Techniques for 
the Peasantry), Chenfu Nongshu (Chen Fu’s Treatise on Agriculture), Mengxi Bitan (Notes of 
Dreams), and Song poems. These private sources are often pivotal for revealing farmland yield 
level, household commercial activities, and household consumption level at the micro-level.  
However, these works have a common problem of small, often one-off, samples. There is 
no easy way out of it other than more textual research and archaeological findings to yield 
more information which is however not the purpose of this study. Farming yield level is a good 
example. Given the sheer complicity of local weather conditions, soil quality and moisture levels, 
and individual farmers’ skills and working hours, it is impossible to know the real yield level 
within a county let alone the whole of China without a systematic survey. It is a common 
practice to pick up a figure for a region or for the country on an anecdotal basis. Such a figure 
should never be regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of farming practices. Rather, it is no more than 
a rough, plausible index when agricultural surveys on any scale were absent. Another example: 
the actual size of the population of Northern Song China is unknown. What accessible are 
numbers of households and male poll-taxpayers. Similarly, the real iron output during the Song 
is nonexistent. The only information is amount of the metal possessed by the government under 
the mandatory erba choufen scheme (20:80 output-sharing between the state and the 
producer).30 The scale and scope of market activities are also elusive, apart from the stated 
commercial tax rates (2–5 per cent). So, just about all Song economic quantities are widely open 
for dispute. Therefore, in many cases, numbers used are merely proxies.  
Likewise, due to the inherent problem of data unavailability, quantitative accuracy is a 
rare luxury for a study such as this. The best hope one can have is to establish a direction and 
trajectory of growth and development. With this in mind, if there is a range of quantities, this 
study takes the minimum.  
 
II 
 
Economic activities during the Northern Song was geographically uneven. To reflect that, 
the Song territory can be divided into five echo-economic zones (see Figure 1).  
Zones A and E were old dry farming zones since the formation of the Chinese empire in 
221 BC. Zone B (including B' and B" from now on) developed paddy rice-farming much later 
mainly during the Tang Period (618–907). At the beginning of the Northern Song, Zone C 
remained a peripheral region to farm,31 known for dangerous parasites, insects, animals, and 
diseases and short life expectancies. It was a region to exile common criminals and political 
dissidents.32 Zone D was even less inhabitable than Zone C during the Northern Song, with a 
                                                 
30 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 586–92; Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, pp. 149–50. 
31 It was documented by an inspector that ‘Rice fields are half tilled and half deserted with only 70 to 80 
per cent of plants standing. Local farmers never fertilise or weed fields. After sowing, everything is up to 
the luck.’ Cited in Gao, ‘Zhongguo Chuantong Jingjide Fazhan Xulie’, p. 73. 
32 Zones C and D were stigmatised as yuan-e (faraway and nasty). During the Northern Song, criminals 
were routinely sent to Zones C and D with their faces tattooed to make their return to society impossible 
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nickname of fachang (‘the killing field’), making it the ultimate dumping ground for criminals 
and dissidents.33 This was an initial condition for the Song economy. 
The regional demographic distribution was as follows (as in 1077/8): Zone A accounted 
for 24 per cent of all Northern Song households and 22 per cent of Norhtern Song China’s 
farmland; Zone B (including B' and B"), 41 per cent households and 46 per cent of farmland; 
Zone C, 19 per cent of households and 21 per cent of farmland; Zones D and E, 8 per cent of 
households and 11 per cent of farmland.34 Most economic activities took place in Zones A, B 
and C. 
To understand how the Song economy evolved, one needs to retrospect to the 
environmental and geo-political factors that dictated Song society. The first-order factor, a force 
majeure, was a climate change, known as the ‘Little Ice Age’. It caused the average temperature 
to drop 1–2° C on East Asian Mainland.35 During 1000–1120 AD, the frequency of warm 
weather on record dropped 90 per cent compared a period either immediately before it or 
thereafter.36 On record, this climate change was severe enough to delay the harvest season for 
about a month,37 push China’s rice-growing belt 2–4° latitudes southwards, and move its 
economic centre 500 km to the Yangzi River (i.e. from Kaifeng to Wuhan, see Figure 2).38  
In addition, there was an odd phenomenon of drought-flood double disasters. The 
Northern Song period experienced the most serious droughts since 500 AD,39 which devastated 
the flora over a vast area in North China and caused unprecedented soil erosion which in turn 
silted up the Yellow River bed and forced the river to burst its banks frequently, and even 
changed its course permanently. In 1108, the city of Julu (Hebei) was completely buried by silt 
of several meters deep; later in 1117, one million lives were lost to another flood in the same 
region.40 According to Ouyang Xiu (1007–72), floods attacked Hebei Province, wiped out 30 to 
90 per cent of farmland in 20 counties at one go.41 The Huai and Yangzi rivers also behaved 
                                                                                                                                                        
(cipei); see Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, vol. 168, ‘Xingfa, 4/1–4/4, 4/15, 4/25, 4/68’, ‘Xingfa 169, 5/12, 5/25’, 
‘Xingfa 170, 6/34’. 
33 Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 63. 
34 For households, see Geelan and Twitchett, Atlas of China p. 13; Needham, Science and Civilisation, 
1961, ch. 4; 1984, pp. 3–46; 1986, pp. 23–181; Chen, Regional Economies, pp. 87, 96; also see Qi, 
‘Productivity Increase’, pp. 43–5; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 122–35. For data for 1102; see Liang, 
Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 164. For farmland, see Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi 
Tianfu Tongji, pp. 290–1; Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, p. 87. See also Perkins, Agricultural Development in 
China, p. 342. 
35 Zhu, ‘Woguo Jinwuqiannianlai Qihou Bianqiande Chubu Yanjiu’, p. 36. There was a cycle of Little Ice 
Ages in the last two millennia: 1 AD, 536, 1000, 1350, 1650, 1750, 1800; see Flohn, World Survey of 
Climatology, p. 236; Schneider and Mass, ‘Volcanic Dust, Sunspots, and Temperature Trends’, pp. 741–6. 
For the global temperature decline, see Loehle, ‘A 2000-Year Global Temperature Reconstruction’.  
36 Song et al. Zhongguo Gudai Ziran Zaiyi Dongtao Fenxi, p. 343.  
37 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 174, ‘Shihuozhi 127’. 
38 Zhao and Yin, ‘Gongyuan 11 Shijihoude Qihou Bianleng Dui Songyihou Jingji Fazhande Dongtai 
Yingxiang’, p. 71; Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 13–14. 
39 Song et al. Zhongguo Gudai Ziran Zaiyi Dongtao Fenxi, p. 123. 
40 Kang, Beisong Wenhua Zhongxin Yanjiu, p. 117. 
41 Ouyang, Ouyang Xiu Quanji, vol. 2, p. 965. 
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erratically due to the environmental disequilibrium caused by the same climate change.42 
The compounded impact was a 10–20 per cent decline in farming yield in a vast region 
north to the Yangzi River.43 There was an official complaint in around 1007 that, although the 
total farmland increased by 417,000 qing, government land tax revenue declined by 718,000 
shi.44 Vast farming areas were simply deserted (feitian) despite government persistent 
promotion of agriculture. In 996, the court official Chen Jing (948–1026) filed a chilling report 
that ‘Across 30 prefectures of 1,000 li surrounding the capital, only 20–30 per cent arable land 
is actually cultivated. Only 50–60 taxpayers pay taxes. … People abandon farming and become 
idle.’45 Over time, it went from bad to worse: Hou Shuxian, an official in charge of farming in 
the north, reported in 1069 that  
 
‘In the capital region, over 10,000 qing, or half the total arable land, is not farmed. … 
The capital region could produce several million shi of rice to feed the army. To cultivate idle 
land will reduce the cost of shipping stipend rice, save the military budget, enrich the country, 
and strengthen the army [fuguo qiangbing].’46  
 
All this means that in North China faming was crippled. In this context, population grew 
in Zone A at the lowest rate, even lower than Zone D where migrants (criminals and dissidents) 
were sent (in households):47 
  980 1101 Annual % 
Old zones 
 A 1,680,755 (100) 3,750,266 (223) 0.67 
 B 2,536,634 (100) 7,262,900 (286) 0.8748 
 E 436,964 (100) 1,349,072 (309) 0.94 
New zones 
 C 879,117 (100) 3,677,907 (418) 1.19 
 D 636,297 (100) 1,474,484 (232) 0.68 
 
                                                 
42 Song et al., Zhongguo Gudai Ziran Zaiyi Dongtao Fenxi, pp. 120, 176, 226–7, 261, 281, 297, 317, 
340–1, 369–70. 
43 Zheng, Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Zhongxin Nanyi He Tangsong Jiangnan Jingji Yanjiu, pp. 39–43; Song 
et al. Zhongguo Gudai Ziran Zaiyi Dongtao Fenxi, p. 187; Zhang, Qihou Yu Renlei, pp. 123–4. 
44 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 174, ‘Shihuozhi 127’. Note: One qing = 100 mu; 1 Song qing = 6 ha. One Song shi 
= 46.2 kg. 
45 Ibid., vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. Note: the term li was elastic. Historically it meant consistently ‘300 
paces long’. A modern observation makes it 500 metres. Hence, 1,000 Song li ≈ 500 km. 
46 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 7/19’.  
47 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 164; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 122–35. See 
also Shiba, Songdai Jiangnan Jingjishi Yanjiu, p. 148. 
48 For an estimate at one per cent per annum, see Shiba, Songdai Jiangnan Jingjishi Yanjiu, p. 148. 
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However, it will be wrong to assume the supply of arable land during the Northern Song 
was inelastic. Firstly, the registered farmland was not necessarily all in good use. It was 
documented in 1067 that of all the registered farmland (4.4 million qing), 11 per cent was 
feitian (‘wasted land’).49 In another account, 70 per cent of farming households did not farm all 
their registered land; they did not paid their expected taxes, either.50 Secondly, new land was 
plentiful in all southern zones (B, C and D). In 979, Emperor Taizong (r. 976–97) allowed people 
to self-declare private ownership over unclaimed land in Zone B.51 People did move to Zone B 
which explains why the immigrant/tenancy rates were so high there.52 Even so, according to 
Shen Kuo (1031–95), the best known proto-scientific writer in Chinese history,53 in 1074 ‘I 
witnessed in Liangzhe Province [at the heart of Zone B] lots of idle and unreported lands yet to 
be utilised in vast seashore in Wenzhou, Mingzhou and Taizhou.’54 By this time, Zones C and D 
were also fairly empty. This was disappointing after decades of government promotion of 
peasant landownership in the region. Now, if the supply of arable land was so elastic, there 
should have no involution in the rural sector. The ‘subsistence-pushed’ hypothesis for the 
Northern Song can be ruled out. 
Clearly, something made the Song farmers half-hearted in their profession. The Song 
state was worried. Farming as well as food supply was on the agenda of the Song government 
all the time. Farming was consistently linked to the state’s goal of fuguo qiangbing (‘enriching 
the country and strengthening the military’).55 To bring more land to cultivation, an array of 
institutions was deployed by the state, including landownership, tax holidays and, to less extent, 
technical assistance. After self-declared ownership over unclaimed land, the offer was extended 
to all state-owned land in the Empire in 980.56 In 1082, army soldiers were allocated 200 mu 
each in military colonies.57 In the process of privatisation, state ownership dropped to merely 
1.4 per cent of China’s total farmland, much lower than the previous Tang.58 Other measures 
included tax deduction and exemption. Although the Land Tax rate was set at 10 per cent of a 
farm’s output,59 farmers were granted 50 per cent tax reduction if they brought idle land back 
to cultivation.60 Taxes on newly reclaimed land went well below 10 per cent, too.61 Land under 
rice was once completely tax-free.62 Tax holidays and government loans were used to persuade 
farmers to stay in Zone A (Hebei) or to settle in Zone C (Jingxi).63 So much so, according to one 
                                                 
49 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. Note: 4.4 million Song qing = 26.4 million ha. 
50 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 5712. 
51 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ’Shihuo 69/36’. 
52 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 126–9. 
53 His Mengxi Bitan provides valuable information about the Song scientific achievements across a wide 
spectrum. 
54 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 7/28’. 
55 Ibid., ‘Shihuo 61/97’. 
56 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. 
57 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Bing 4/11’. Note: 200 mu = 12 ha. 
58 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 290; Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, p. 299. 
59 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’.  
60 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 63/195’. 
61 Ibid., ‘Shihuo 63/162’. 
62 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. 
63 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 63/182’, ‘Shihuo 69/38’. 
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source, only 30 per cent of land under cultivation actually bore tax before 1069.64 Government 
technical provision was also well documented.65 If this was not enough, during 1023 to 1063, 
with the mounting ransoms to the northern nomads and the military spending on the northern 
front, the emperor decided not to increase land taxes.66  
From the Malthusian point of view, one thinks of more aggressive rice-farming outside 
the disaster-stricken Zones A and E as a way out the Song agrarian crisis. However, irrigation 
was the sine qua non for rice-farming across all regions under the Song rule, not to mention the 
frost-free season as another prerequisite, a factor that separates China from Southeast and 
South Asia where rain-fed rice-farming has been more common. Only about 5 per cent of rice 
paddies are rain-fed in China, compared with 40 per cent in South and Southeast Asia and 29 
per cent on the world average.67 China’s low annual precipitation is a huge constraint. In 
contemporary China, for argument’s sake, Zone A has 500–1,000 millimetres; Zone B, 1,000–
1,500 millimetres; Zones C and D, above 2,000 millimetres; and Zone E, 100–500 millimetres.68 
No single zone in modern China is able to grow rice without artificial irrigation (in millimetres of 
water/day):69 
 
Zone  Seepage loss Plant evaporation Water deficit for rice 
A and E  360–1,560 480–840 840–2,280 
B  30–1,120 280–800 350–1,800 
C and D  30–160 270–540 300–700 
 
In Zones B and C, for example, the annual rainfall (1,000–2,000 millimetres) supports 
rice-growing for merely a week.  
The Northern Song state did promote irrigation very ostentatiously. In 973, for example, 
it amassed 200,000 workers to build an irrigation system in Hangzhou.70 But the effectiveness 
of such projects is questionable. Of the state-owned land merely 0.5 per cent was irrigated.71 In 
1011–69, six irrigation works were carried out across Zones A and B, creating only 42,800 qing 
irrigated land, barely one per cent of the Song total of 4.4 million qing (as in 1065).72 By the 
end of the Northern Song, the scale of irrigation remained 7–8 per cent of all farmland within 
                                                 
64 Zhou, Zhongguo Caizhengshi, p. 249. 
65 Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 6/11 – 7/57’. 
66 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. 
67 Neue, ‘Methane Emission from Rice Fields’, p. 467, Table 4. 
68 Based on www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/11803/China/70982/Precipitation. 
69 Zhao et al., Zhongguo Tezhong Dao, p. 100. 
70 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 97, ‘Hequzhi 49’.  
71 See Shiba, Songdai Jiangnan Jingjishi Yanjiu, p. 203. 
72 Tou, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. In fact, one cannot assume shili (water projects) were all for 
irrigation. Many large Song shuili projects were in fact devoted to canal construction and river flood 
control, not to rice-farming; see Fang, ‘Songdai Heliu Qianxi Yu Shuili Gongcheng’. In Hangzhou, the 
state employed several million worker-days to build a dyke along the sea front against tidal waves in 
1012; see Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 97, ‘Hequzhi 49’. 
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the Song territory.73 This comes as no surprise because the irrigation rate of China’s all 
farmland was only 24 per cent in as late as 1919.74 With such a low irrigation rate, rice-farming 
had to be limited despite the government propaganda.  
Moreover, even if irrigation was available universally, considering a shortened growth 
season at the mercy of the Little Ice Age, double-cropping of rice across Zones B and C (where 
67 per cent of Song China’s farmland lay) was not performed according to all the known 
Northern Song sources. It was well documented that a single rice crop a year was the norm in 
Zones B, C and D where rice-farming was well suited.75 The earliest known experiment with 
double-cropping of rice took place in 1178 when the Northern Song was over.76 Champa Rice 
promoted by Emperor Zhenzong in 1012 across Zone B has been a supply-side of story. The 
actual demand for the new rice strain has been poorly justified,77 not to mention that the 
Chinese knew about this rice long before the Song.78 Double-cropping of rice became 
common much later during the Ming Period (1368–1644).79 Even so, in the 1930s, only four 
per cent of China’s farmland was double-cropped with rice.80 This is what the ‘Champa Rice 
Hypothesis’ completely overlooks. The widely quoted ‘second harvest of rice’ during the Song 
(zaishu dao, or daosun, meaning “rice’s offspring”) came in fact from re-tiller of old stems. The 
output from such re-growth was neither predictable nor guaranteed.81 So it cannot be justified 
as a crop. Rather, it is a weed.  
The alleged double-cropping of rice during the Song has so far been based on the 
dubious notion that ‘early-ripening rice’ equates with ‘fast-ripening rice’ and then with ‘rice 
double cropping’.82  
                                                 
73 A total of 30,794,365–36,117,800 Song mu was recorded under irrigated rice vis-à-vis 443,792,405 
Song mu farmland in total; based on Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 290–1; 
Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, p. 87. See also Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, p. 342. A higher 
figure of 36,117,800 comes from Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. 
74 Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 16, 64. 
75 Geelan and Twitchett, Atlas of China, p. 13; Needham, Science and Civilisation, 1961, ch. 4; 1984, pp. 
3–46; 1986, pp. 23–181; Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 87, 96; also see Qi, ‘Songdai Shehui 
Shengchanlide Fazhan Jiqizai Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Fazhan Guochengzhongde Diwei’, pp. 43–5; Wu, 
Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 122–35; Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 117. For the geographic 
distribution of rice cultivation during the Northern Song, see Song Xi, ‘Beisong Daomide Chandi Fenbu’. 
76 For the first recorded double-cropping of rice in Guangnan Xi, see Zhou, Lingwai Daida, vol. 8.  
77 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 8, ‘Benjin 8’; and vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’.  
78  Wang, Tang Huiyao, vol. 98 ‘Linyi Kingdom’; Zhou, Lingwai Daida, vol. 2 ‘Annan’ and vol. 3 
‘Duonong’.  
79 Li, Tangdai Jiangnan Nongyede Fazhan, pp. 119–20; and his ‘Songmo Zhi Mingchu Jiangnan Nongmin 
Jingyingde Bianhua’; Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 117; Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 98–101; 
Chao, Man and Land in Chinese History, p. 199. See also Chen and Zheng, ‘Daozuo Qiyuande Kaogu 
Tansuo’; Ting, ‘Zhongguo Zaipei Daozhongde Qiyuan Jiqi Yanbian’; Yan, ‘Zhongguo Daozuo Nongyede 
Qiyuan’; Lin, ‘Changjiang Qiantanjiang Zhongxiayou Diqu Xinshiqi Shidai Dili Yu Daozuode Qiyuan He 
Fenbu’; Cao, ‘Jiangxi Wannian Xianrendong Yicun Zaiyanjiu Ji Zhongguo Daozuo Nongye Qiyuan Xin 
Renshi’; Fan, ‘Jiangnan Diqude Shiqian Nongye’. 
80 Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 16, 44. 
81 Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, p. 97. 
82 In ancient China, ‘early-ripening’ (measured by crop harvest time) and ‘fast-ripening’ (measured by 
the duration needed for crops to mature) were not identical. In Shi Jing (Book of Odes) of the eleventh to 
sixth centuries BC, crops were already categorised as ‘early-sowing’, ‘late-sowing’, ‘early-ripening’ and 
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The question is whether the Song population could live on a single crop a year, 
something that needs to be investigated. There are three facts here. First, according to the Song 
official famine relief standards, an adult needed two sheng of grain (or 924 grams, presumably 
husked) to maintain subsistence.83 This is reasonable per diem, as according to John Buck’s 
survey in the 1920s–30s, 924 grams of traditionally produced rice, wheat and millet provided 
2,270, 2,220, and 2,320 kilocalories of energy, respectively.84 A family of, say generously, six 
(three adults and three children) would need 4,240 grams per day or 1,550 kilograms a year, if 
weighting each child as half an adult in food consumption. To take into account wastage 
during milling,85 the gross amount of food should be around 2,060 kilograms. Second, it has 
been generally agreed that the average yield of the main crop from farmland of the medium 
fertility was roughly one Song shi per Song mu in the north and about twice as much per mu in 
the south.86 Third, the Song total registered farmland was 3.1 million qing in 996 AD.87 With 
these stylised facts, the Song farming regions would look like the following (with the afore-
mentioned geographical distribution of farmland in 1077 as a proxy):88 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘late-ripening’; see Xia, Cihai, p. 97. In Ho’s work, however, ‘early-ripening’ and ‘fast-ripening’ are 
worryingly interchangeable. For critique, see Seng, ‘Songdaide Wandao He Zaodao’.  
83 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 175, ‘Shihuozhi 128’, and vol. 191, ‘Bingzhi 144’. One Song sheng = 1/100 Song 
shi = 462 grams. Two Song sheng = 924 grams. 
84 Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 66. 
85 Rice-milling usually causes 20 per cent loss in weight to husks and another 8–12 per cent to bran; see 
http://www.knowledgebank.irri.org/rkb/index.php/rice-milling. Wheat loses 20–22 per cent to bran in the 
milling process; see http://www.apgoe.com/wheat.htm.  
86 Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, p. 115; Ge and Gu, ‘Songdai Jiangnan Diqude 
Liangshi Muchan Jiqi Gusuan Fangfa Bianxi’ pp. 78–9; Hua, Shongshi Lunji, pp. 4–5; Qi, ‘Songdai Shehui 
Shengchanlide Fazhan Jiqizai Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Fazhan Guochengzhongde Diwei’, pp. 38–9; Li, 
Tangdai Jiangnan Nongyede Fazhan, p. 148. Noted, the Song shi and mu were lighter and smalller than 
their modern counterparts: one Song shi = 0.66 modern shi, and one Song mu = 0.9 modern mu; see 
Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 545; Wu, ‘Lishishang Liangshi Shangpinliang Cegu’, 
p. 19. One Song shi per Song mu = 46.2 kg. 
87 Tou, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. Note: It is agreed that only 70–80 per cent of farmland ever 
got registered; see Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, p. 172. However, if this 
margin of error persisted, official figures still serve as minimum proxies after a ‘hair cut’. More headaches 
come from the common practice of zhemu (land unit conversion): A Song cadastral mu was not in a fixed 
physical size. Often, the average output from one mu of the medium fertility in a region was picked as a 
common denominator to convert outputs from plots in different fertilities. After that, farmers were taxed 
according to annual outputs not the actual acreage. The conversion rate was as high as 10:1; see Xu, 
Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 70/120’. In this context, although the official mu was always 240 paces in 
perimeter, the actual mu upon which the land tax was levied varied from 360 to 1,200 paces. For the 
Qing case, see Zhao, ‘Jishu Wucha, Zhemu Jiqi Juli Shuaijian Guilü Yanjiu’. That should not deter anyone 
to use the Song cadastral records so long as one knows the complexity behind those them. Note: one 
qing = 100 mu. 
88 Geelan and Twitchett, Atlas of China p. 13; Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 87, 96; also see Qi, 
‘Songdai Shehui Shengchanlide Fazhan Jiqizai Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Fazhan Guochengzhongde Diwei’, 
pp. 43–5. Note: here, the shares of Zones A and E were almost larger than in 1077 because of a decline 
in farming there. But we stick to the 1077 shares because there is no other reliable information for 996. 
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Zone   Million Song mu Main grain type Per mu yield 
 A 68.8 Millet/wheat 1 Song shi 
 B 142.6 Rice 2 Song shi 
 C 66.0 Rice 2 Song shi 
 D 1.3 Rice 2 Song shi 
 E  31.3 Millet/wheat 1 Song shi 
 Total farmland 310.0 
 China-wide average per Song mu 1.7 Song shi 
 Total food stock 520 million shi 
 
The total food stock would be in the region of 520 million shi (24 million metric tons) 
and provide for 11.7 million households.89 But in the same year (i.e. 996), Song China had only 
4.6 million households.90  
Now, considering the impact of the climate change, Zone A could even be a write-off 
from farming. Then, the food stock would be 451 million shi (20.8 million tons) enough to 
sustain 10.1 million households. Song agriculture had at least an overcapacity of 120 per cent. 
Champa Rice is not needed in the equation. 
But the Little Ice Age did create a niche for a winter crop in Zones A and B in the 
following pattern: a summer crop in Year One (including rice, a 145–175 day growing season) 
→ a winter crop (a ±175 day growing season) → another summer crop in Year Two (a 145–175 
day growing season).91 Winter-wheat (sumai, or ‘over-year wheat’) fills the bill very well when a 
combination of a low temperature and minimum irradiance was lethal for the vast majority of 
annuals.92 After the initial two-year cycle, farmers sowed and harvested twice in the same plot 
each calendar year. This was a different type of double cropping. This cropping pattern was 
confirmed in 1037 that ‘the Lower Yangzi is fertile with many products. ... In farming, the 
region has rice after harvesting [winter] wheat which makes two crops a year.’93 The yield of 
winter-wheat from land of medium fertility was about 0.8 Song shi per Song mu.94 
To add winter-wheat to the farming cycle began in Tang China around the eighth 
                                                 
89 Note: one Song shi = 46.2 kg.  
90 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 122; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, p. 346. Note: 
Liangs’ figure is 4,574,257; Wu’s is 3,574,257, one million apart. To play safe, the former is chosen. 
91 Numerous references; e.g. Ge, Song Liao Xia Jin Jingji Yanxi, pp. 103–13; Li, ‘Changjiang Xiayou 
Daomai Fuzhongzhide Xingcheng He Fazhang’, p. 7; Kong, ‘Jianlun Zhongtang Yilai Chuantong 
Nongyede Yaosu Shengchanlü’. 
92 See Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 98–100. 
93 Zhu, Wujun Tujing Xuji, vol. 1, ‘Wuchan’. 
94 Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, p. 115; Ge and Gu, ‘Songdai Jiangnan Diqude 
Liangshi Muchan Jiqi Gusuan Fangfa Bianxi’ pp. 78–9; Qi, ‘Songdai Shehui Shengchanlide Fazhan Jiqizai 
Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Fazhan Guochengzhongde Diwei’, pp. 38–9. 
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century.95 The Tang tax system, the liangshui zhi (‘Two Seasonal Taxes’), was synchronised with 
one crop harvest in spring (winter-wheat) and the other in autumn (the main crop).96 However, 
winter-wheat gained wide popularity only during the Northern Song thanks to two specific 
reasons. First, the Little Ice Age climate change prolonged the winter season which made 
winter-wheat a sound insurance policy, described by the Song official Ouyang Xiu (1007–1072) 
as ‘people raise debts in winter and repay their debts with their winter-wheat harvest in early 
summer; they raise debts in summer-autumn and repay their debts with their main harvest 
before winter.’97 In fact, the Song low-interest qingmiao fa (‘Green-shoots Loan Scheme’) 
issued in 1069 was designed to help those whose winter-wheat crop failed.98 Second, the Song 
tenancy rate was high, affecting 30–50 per cent of all farmland.99 Winter crop was extra-
attractive to tenants because the second crop was customarily rent-free.100 Evidence indicates 
that winter cropping was carried out on a large scale and remained the norm in regions like the 
Lower Yangzi until the early twentieth century.101 
Assuming that winter-wheat was adopted where it was suited, the Song staple food 
production would look as follows when China’s farmland reached 4.4 million qing (as in 
1065):102 
 
                                                 
95  Li, Tangdai Jiangnan Nongyede Fazhan, p. 116; Li, ‘Changjiang Xiayou Daomai Fuzhongzhide 
Xingcheng He Fazhang’, pp. 16–17. The Tang poet Bai Juyi (772–846) described it as:  
 
When it is rainless and windy in the Third Month  
Wheat ears wither and die, 
When it is frosty and cold in the Ninth Month 
Rice ears go empty and dry.  
 
Cited in Tang, Tangsong Shici Jianshang Zidian, p. 863. 
96 Likewise, it was recorded during the Northern Song that in Zone B the xiashui (Summer Tax) was paid 
in wheat, textiles, and cash. No rice was involved. See Wu, Tangsong Zhiji Tianshui Zhidu Bianqian Yanjiu, 
p. 111. In another account, ‘The Summer Tax payment in grain is always made of wheat; the Autumn Tax 
payment in grain is always made of millet, rice, legume and so on.’ Cited in Song, Songshi Yanjiu 
Luncong, p. 90. 
97 Cited in Hua, Songshi Lunji, p. 23. 
98 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 176, ‘Shihuozhi 129’. 
99 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, p. 269. For the kehu category (guest households), see Liang, Zhongguo 
Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 126–9. 
100 Li, ‘Changjiang Xiayou Daomai Fuzhongzhide Xingcheng He Fazhang’, p. 9; Ge and Gu, ‘Songdai 
Jiangnan Diqude Liangshi Muchan Jiqi Gusuan Fangfa Bianxi’, p. 82. The Song sharecropping practised a 
40:60 split in favour of the landlord if he provided draught animals or in favour of the tenant if the 
landlord had no input other than land. See Yang, ‘Songdai Mintian Chuzude Dizu Xingtai Yanjiu’, p. 139; 
Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 108; Ge and Gu, ‘Songdai Jiangnan Diqude Liangshi Muchan Jiqi 
Gusuan Fangfa Bianxi’, pp. 80–2. 
101 E.g. Li, ‘Rengen Shimu Yu Mingqing Jiangnan Nongminde Jingying Guimo’. According to the British 
East India Company’s Hamilton H. Lindsay who travelled in 1832 to Shanghai on the Amherst, ‘Upon our 
arrival, wheat was just harvested in. That was immediately followed by ploughing, sowing and irrigation 
for growing rice. Rice ripens in the Ninth Month.’ See Hu, ‘A-meishide Hao 1832 Nian Shanghai Zhixin 
Jishi’, p. 277. In the 1930s, 18.6 per cent of China’s farmland was subject to the ‘winter-wheat plus rice 
regime’; see Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 16, 46. 
102 Tou, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’.  
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Zone   Million Song mu Main grain type Per mu yield 
 A 97.7 Winter-wheat + millet 1.8 Song shi 
 B 202.4 Winter-wheat + rice 2.8 Song shi 
 C 93.7 Rice 2 Song shi 
 D 1.8 Rice 2 Song shi 
 E  44.4 Millet/wheat 1 Song shi 
 Total 440.0 
 China-wide average per Song mu 2.2 Song shi 
 Total food stock 978 million Song shi 
  
The gain from the winter crop was likely to be 240 million Song shi, or one quater extra, 
to make an aggregate food stock of 978 million Song shi (45.2 milliom tons). It was 
documented that the payment ratio between the Summer Tax and the Autumn Tax 1:4 in loose 
grain (as in 1077),103 matching rather neatly our calculation. So, the climate change did make 
the Song farming more efficient. 
To take away afore-mentioned 11 per cent lying idle, the Song food stock would be 870 
million Song shi (40.2 milliom tons), able to feed 19.5 million households. In the same year, 
China only had 12.9 million households.104 Song agriculture thus still ran 50 per cent 
overcapacity. If farming in Zone A was again omitted, the amount of 32.9 million tons would 
support 16.0 million households. To push it further, without a winter crop at all, China would 
still produce 738 million Song shi (34.1 milliom tons) to maintain 16.6 million households. This 
is 25–30 per cent overcapacity.105 So, strickly speaking, winter-wheat helped but was not 
imperative.  
The overcapacity of Song agriculture, which has not been recognised before, explins why 
the Song farmland acreage moved up and down like a yoyo when the population kept growing, 
which has puzzled many (Table 2).106 If the population lived a hand-tomouth life, China would 
have had seen one-third of the Song households facing starvation in 1085. But from the 
average point of view, the overcapacity was still 40 per cent over time. So, the periodical 
reduction of farmland could well be deliberate. 
The acid test comes from food prices. Had the Song population growth been driven by 
surplus yield, food must have become cheaper. But that was not the case. Cash prices of rice 
increased about 500 per cent in densely populated regions (capital city, lower Yellow and lower 
                                                 
103 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 289. 
104 Ibid., p. 124; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 347.  
105 This approach differs from that of Perkins who worked out China’s national average yield per mu 
from a total food bill divided by the total farmland; see his Agricultural Development in China, pp. 14, 17.  
106 It is worth noting that the Song Period was not unique regarding a decline in farmland coinciding 
with a rise in population. During the Ming Period (1368–1644), China’s farmland contracted by 27 per 
cent from 1393 to 1502; see Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, p. 223. 
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Yangzi):107 
 
  Kaifeng (A)108 Hedong (A) Liangzhe (B) 
 AD wen/one dou rice AD wen/one dou rice AD wen/one dou rice 
 989 30 979 10 970 20 
 1074 150 1086 50 1098 100 
 Annual % 1.9 1.5 1.3 
 
As these prices were likely to be distorted by rampant inflation, currency heterogeneity, 
and multiple exchange rates of the time,109 a better gauge is rice prices relative to iron and silk 
(i.e. terms of trade). They all moved in the same direction as the cash prices:110 
 
 AD Amount iron/shi rice AD Bolts silk cloth/shi rice 
 997 16 997 0.24 
 1080 56 1108 0.95 
 Annual % 1.5 1.2 
 
The point is that these prices all grew faster than the Song households. The notion 
‘cheaper food feeding the Northern Song population’ was a red herring. This phenomenon 
dismisses the afore-mentioned ‘surplus-driven’ hypothesis. Meanwhile, there was no 
widespread famine or a large quantity of food imports. Sufficient food had to be produced to 
meet the aggregate demand. It means that the Song production overcapacity was not 
exploited.  
Buy why did the Song population not maximise food output? The explanation leads to 
the geopolitical factor of external threat. To begin with, the Northern Song Empire was only 
about 40 per cent of the size of the Tang (Tang: 618–907).111 This territorial contraction was a 
result of three militarily powerful nomadic groups living side by side with the Chinese: the 
Khitans (Liao Kingdom: 916–1125), the Tanguts (Xixia Kingdom: 1038–1227) and then the 
Jurchens (Jin Kingdom: 1115–1234). Despite their small population sizes compared with the 
                                                 
107 Cheng, Songdai Wujia Yanjiu, pp. 125, 132–4, 139–41. Noted, these figures only serve as rough 
indications. 
108 Kaifeng was the capital city where food was persistently more expensive. Hedong was one of the 
oldest northern farming provinces; Liangzhe was a new farming province at the time. 
109 For the Northern Song inflation, see Peng, Zhongguo Huobi Shi, p. 505; Guo, ‘Songchaode Wujia 
Biandong Yu Jizang Lunzui’, p. 72; Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 1104–7. For multiple currencies and 
exchange rates, see Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 287–321, 331. 
110 Iron-rice prices, cited in Hartwell, ‘Markets, Technology, and the Structure’, p. 33; silk-rice prices, 
based on Yu, Zhongguo Jiage Shi, pp. 602, 610. 
111 Tan, Jiangming Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji, pp. 41–2, 51–2; Fu et al., Zhongguo Junshi Shi, Lidai 
Zhanzheng Nianbiao, Xia, pp. 1–13.  
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Song,112 these groups firmly controlled the areas where the old Great Wall and the Silk Road 
were located. China’s old farming and industrial core along the Yellow River was eventually lost 
to the Jurchens in 1127, which ended the Northern Song (Figure 2). Arguably, the scale, scope 
and persistence of the southward expansion by the nomads, who were specialised with violence 
to prey on farming communities, were dictated by the very same climate change that made the 
livelihood in the Steppes far less sustainable.113 So, the origin of the problem was the same. 
But the similarity ended there.  
The pressure from external invasion formed yet another force majeure to Northern Song 
China. Unlike the climate change which only tested China’s farming and administrative 
capacities to maintain food security, the threat from the nomads tested China’s capacity to 
generate non-food wealth. In other words, the climate change only made the Song farming 
more efficient farming but did not alter China’s growth trajectory. The external threat of 
invasion however forced the Song mindset, behaviour and growth trajectory to embark on 
some drastic changes. 
Most puzzlingly, the response of the Song state to the external threat was not to fight 
but to appease and compromise.114 China’s military vulnerability and diplomatic weakness 
were exploited to the full by nomads who demanded annual ransoms as a precondition for 
peace. In accordance with the humiliating ‘1004 Chanyuan Treaty’, the Khitans received 
annually 200,000 bolts of silk cloth and 100,000 taels of silver (3.7 metric tons). As the Song 
economy grew fast, the sums increased accordingly to 300,000 bolts of silk cloth and 200,000 
taels of silver (7.4 metric tons) in the ‘1042 Guannan Treaty’.115 The Tanguts along another 
stretch of the Song border followed the suit, demanding 130,000 bolts of silk cloth, 500,000 
taels of silver, and 200,000 catties of tea a year as their price for peace with China.116 More 
wealth was forcefully transferred to the coffers of the greedier Jurchens, a third group who 
joined the kill. In 1126, the Song state shipped to the Jurchen Jin 5 million taels of gold, 50 
million taels of silver, 2 million bolts of silk cloth, and 11,000 draft animals. Another 378,000 
taels of gold, 7,140,000 taels silver, and 1,040,000 bolts of silk went to the Jurchens a year 
later.117 These were heavy fiscal burden on the Song state finance. Meanwhile, to secure their 
prey, the Khitan-Song treaties stipulated that the Song side was not allowed to build walls or 
dig moats along the border to obstruct the Khitan cavalry.118 Song China lived on borrowed 
time; and the stake was high. 
Considering that the Song state collected about two million bolts of silk cloth a year as 
taxes, the silk ransom was easy to fulfil domestically. But the Song economy produced only 
200,000 taels of silver a year (as in 1078),119 not enough for the ransom of over one million 
taels a year. Some silver had to come from outside and through voluntary and peaceful 
                                                 
112 E.g. in 938 AD, the total household number of the Khitan Liao was 127,200; see Tuo, Liao Shi, 
‘Dilizghi 1’.  
113 For the Mongol case, see Gumilev, Searches for an Imaginary Kingdom. 
114 Cheng, ‘Songchu Mibinglunde Jiantao’. 
115 Mao, Songchaode Duiwai Jiaowang Geju, pp. 166, 176. 
116 Ibid., p. 177. 
117 Ibid., pp. 50, 227. 
118 Ibid., pp. 167, 176. 
119 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 185, ‘Shihuozhi 138’. Note: a tael = 37.5 grams. 
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exchange given the weakness of the Song military. Moreover, to maintain a rapport with its 
nomadic neighbours, the Song state made sure a continuous supply of luxuries to the northern 
borders.120 Such luxuries only came by sea routes thanks to the loss of the Silk Road.  
Facing its draconian hard-budget diktat, more non-food production and more trade were 
the only option in a perfect sample of Toynbee’s challenge-response theory.121 To survive, the 
Song state turned quickly to clear-cut mercantilism, no more ambivalence towards trade and 
merchants. This was a volte-face from China’s long-entrenched norm of yishang (confining 
trade).122 A preferential tax rate was set at half the rate imposed on agriculture.123 There were 
marked regional differences in freedom and tax burden. Cities in the north bore more 
commercial taxes in both the total and per household terms (Table 3).  
Zones B, C and D were corvée-tax havens, ‘Special Economic Zones’ of the time: 
 
Zone A Very strong government/military presence; taxes paid mainly in kind; heavy 
in corvée services.124 
Zone B Some government presence; taxes paid mainly in cash; hardly any corvée 
imposed.125 
Zone C Weak government presence; taxes paid mainly in cash; no corvée services 
recorded.126 
Zone D The weakest government presence; hardly any tax or corvée.127 
Zone E The same as Zone A 
 
So, predictably, the market found it cosy in the south where more industrial and 
commercial growth was generated. Also, it was no accident that paper currency and business 
credit were invented there. 
The state priority was given to overseas trade. Large sea-worthy ships were designed and 
                                                 
120 In an official account, the Jurchen Jin imported from its ‘belligerent’, meaning the Northern Song, 
lychees, longans, mandarins, olives, bananas, sugar, sapanwood, rhinoceros horns, elephant tusks, and 
cinnabar – items native to China and beyond; see Tuo, Jin Shi, ‘Shihuo 5’; see also Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, 
vol. 2, pp. 1030–41. 
121 See Somervell, A Study of History; Kearny, ‘Arnold Toynbee; Challenge and Response’. 
122 Tian, Zhongguo Gudai Xingzheng Shilue, p. 228. 
123 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’ and vol. 186, ‘Shihuozhi 139’. For the debate, see Guo, 
Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 238–41. 
124 For geographic deployment of officials, see Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 132–4. For regional taxes, 
see Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihou 15/1–20’; Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, 
pp. 223–8. 
125 Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 132–4; Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihuo 7/13–14’. 
126 Cheng, Songdai Diyu Jingji, pp. 132–4. 
127 Ibid., pp. 132–4, 263–4. 
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built; new sea routes opened; and new trading destinations explored,128 new policies and 
institutions created and implemented.129 In the official account, 33 foreign countries were on 
the trading list. Apart from those in nearby Southeast Asia and the India Subcontinent, there 
were new ones in the remote Arabian Peninsular (Tazi) and East African coast (Zanj).130 The 
scale was more or less the same as Zheng He’s voyages in the early fifteenth century. Ports 
along China’s southeast coast were free from nomad-raiders and geographical handy for this 
new development (see Figure 1).  
To yield overseas trade returns, a network of customs offices of two tiers (wu and chang) 
were set up and officials were given performance quotas to fulfil.131 Imported materials, 
predominately xiang yao (spices, perfumes and pharmaceuticals), were subject to state 
monopoly for revenue. Pharmaceuticals were controlled by the shibo si (Bureau for Maritime 
Trade). The bureau then distributed the imports through the taiyiju maiyaosuo (Pharmacy of the 
Imperial Medical Bureau) via a chain of 1,800–2,000 wu (bureaus) and chang (fairs) whose 
tentacles reached each of the 1,235 counties across the Empire to sell goods and collect 
commercial taxes on them at the same time.132 Between 1076 and 1078, an amount of 
frankincense worth 1.5 billion bronze coins was sold that way.133 This makes on average 60 
coins per household, not trivial. In the end, pharmaceutical imports altered China’s 
pharmacopoeia. According to the Song pharmacopoeia published in 1080, 33 per cent of 
animal ingredients, 53 per cent of plant ingredients and 13 per cent of mineral ingredients 
came from overseas.134 Similarly, spices were monopolised by the same bureau and re-sold to 
the domestic consumers through another network of the shiyiwu (Market Trading Office) for a 
profit margin of 20–100 per cent.135  
It worked. A strong growth in maritime tax revenues confirms this success:136 
 AD Annual maritime tax (106 coins) Index  1087 prices137 
 1087  416     100  100 
 1106  1,110    267   134 
 Annual growth %  5.3 1.6 
                                                 
128  Zhou, Lingwai Daida; Gong, Xiyang Fanguo Zhi; Ma, Yingya Shenglan; Shen, ‘Zhenghe 
Baochuanduide Dongfei Hangcheng’; H and D, Xinbian Zhenghe Hanghai Tuji, pp. 84–98. 
129 For a survey of studies of the Northern Song trade policy; see Li, Songchao Zhengfu Guomai Zhidu 
Yanjiu, pp. 10–25. 
130 Lin, Songdai Xiangyao Maoyi Shi, pp. 162–5. 
131 Deng, Chinese Premodern Economy, p. 268; Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji 
Kaolue, p. 233; Liu ‘Song China’s Water Transport Revolution Revisited’. 
132 Lin, Songdai Xiangyao Maoyi Shi, pp. 270–93; Song, ‘Songdaide Shangshui Wang’. 
133 Deng, Port Guangzhou, p. 100. 
134 Deng, Maritime Sector, p. 85. 
135 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 184, ‘Shihuozhi 137’. 
136 Wang, Liangsong Caizheng Shi, pp. 723–4.  
137 Calculation is based on 238 per cent inflation of food prices from 1101 to 1125; see Long, ‘Songdai 
Liangjia Fenxi’, p. 159. 
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As a result, the maritime duties accounted for 15 per cent of the government total 
revenue.138 
On the domestic front, government procurement-marketing schemes involved anything 
that the state was able to lay its hands on: metals, silk textiles, tea, salt, wine and so forth. Tea, 
wine, salt and silk were monopolised.139 Tea was controlled by 6 government bureaus and 13 
centres. They routinely handled some 23 million catties a year, earning the government 
between 100 and 300 million coins.140 Over 100 million decilitres of wine and 400 million 
catties of salt were handled under the government procurement schemes on a yearly basis.141 
The amount of silk cloth bought by the government increased five-fold from 600,000 bolts (in 
1004) to 3,000,000 bolts (in 1041), with an annual growth rate of 4.5 per cent.142 All this sped 
up commercialisation of the economy. 
The government also collected revenue disproportionately more in cash than goods, 
called zhebian.143 From 1021 to 1065, the cash component in the tax revenue grew 226 per 
cent and the cash share in the total revenue jumped from 18 per cent to 52 per cent.144 On the 
other hand, Poll Tax payments collected in home-made cloth decline in relative terms in relation 
to a continuous increase in poll-taxpayers:145  
 
 AD Tax payments in home-made cloth (bolts) 
 997 2,180,000 (100) 
 1077 2,672,323 (123) 
 Annual growth % 0.2 
 
Similarly, the Land Tax collected in grain stagnated first and then declined in absolute 
terms:146  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Chen and Wu, China’s Maritime Trade, pp. 180–2. For the debate, see Guo, Liansong Chengxiang 
Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 390–405. 
139 Tuo, Song Shi, vols 180–6, ‘Shihuozhi 134, 135’. 
140 Hua, Songshi Lunji, pp. 76, 109. The amount of 23 million catties of tea required about 5.1 million 
working days; based on Hua, Songshi Lunji, p. 58.  
141 Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, Song Yuan Juan, pp. 353, 402. Official involvement in 
market deals and profiteering became epidemic and corruption was widespread. But that was a separate 
issue. 
142 Li, Songchao Zhengfu Guomai Zhidu Yanjiu, p. 466. 
143 Zhang, ‘Songdai Zhebianzhi Tanxi’. 
144 Quan, ‘Tang Song Zhengfu Suiru Yu Hubi Jingjide Guanxi’, p. 202. 
145 Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 288–9. 
146 Ibid., pp. 288–9; also Bao, Songdai Difang Caizhengshi Yanjiu, pp. 282, 316–9. 
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 AD Land Tax payments in food (shi) 
 997 31,707,000 (97) 
 1021 32,782,000 (100) 
 Annual growth % 0.1 
 1021 32,782,000 (100) 
 1077 17,887,257 (55) 
 Annual growth % –1.1 
 
From 1021 to 1086, the cash component amounted for about a quarter to a third of all 
Land Tax payments,147 meaning that farming households now paid cash for their dues. 
Tenants’ rent payment had the same trend because their landlords needed cash.148  
Overall, the fiscal importance of the agricultural sector became marginalised while the 
share of the non-agricultural sector doubled:149 
 AD Total (109 coins) Agricultural share Non-agricultural share 
 997 35.6  65% 35% 
 1077 70.7 30% 70% 
 
In addition, the state issued negotiable securities such as yanyin (Salt Permits), chayin (Tea 
Permits) and dudie (Certificates for Monks and Nuns) for investors.150 All these securities were 
part of the public debts raised by the Song state to ease its budget deficits in the absence of 
foreign borrowings of the time (106 coins):151 
 AD Revenues Expenditures Balance 
 997 70,893 86,950 -16,057 
 1021 140,298 168,044 -27,746 
 1049 126,252 126,252 0 
 1065 116,138 120,343 -4,205 
 1086 82,491 91,910 -9,419 
                                                 
147 For tax components, see Wang, Liangsong Caizheng Shi, pp. 688–92; for prices, see Peng, Zhongguo 
Huobi Shi, pp. 487, 507. 
148 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, ch. 9. The reform was called zhebian; see Zhang, ‘Songdai Zhebianzhi 
Tanxi’. 
149 Ye, ‘Songdai Gongshangye Fazhangde Lishi’, p. 108; Bao, Songdai Difang Caizhengshi Yanjiu, pp. 
282, 316–9. 
150 In 1078, salt permits sold by the government were worth 23 billion coins; see Li, Songchao Zhengfu 
Guomai Zhidu Yanjiu, p. 222. Regarding Certificates for Monks and Nuns, a total of 20,5918 such 
certificates were sold for 32.2 billion coins in 1068–1109; see Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, chs 22, 23, 25, 
29; Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 259–68. Wang, Liangsong Caizheng 
Shi, pp. 741–3. 
151 Wang, Liangsong Caizheng Shi, pp. 678–86; Cheng, ‘Songdaide Gongzhai’. 
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All this indicates substantial reshaping and restructuring in the economy. The most 
significant development occurred in heavy industry. Metal production grew exponentially. It is 
documented in 1040 that it took 700 industrial households in Shaanxi to produce 100,000 
catties of iron (60 metric tons) each year.152 It was a minor production centre;153 but there was 
no evidence to suggest its technical inferiority. If Shaanxi is used as a benchmark, the annual 
output of 28.5 million catties of the metal would need some 200,000 industrial households, 
excluding iron mining, coal mining, charcoal marking (hence lumbering) and transportation.154  
Although the north (mainly Zone A for iron production) has so far received most 
attention and publicity,155 it was the south (Zones B, C and D) that experienced a real take-off 
in metal production. From 727/836 to 1077/8, iron (dominated by the north) grew 14-fold; but 
copper increased 39-fold; tin, 54-fold; and lead, whopping 467-fold. Copper, tin and lead 
mainly came from the south.156 At its peak, each household in Zones C and D shouldered an 
output of 12.3 catties of metals a year (government procurements only, as in 1077).157 Table 4 
shows the growth momentum. 
The metal sector underpinned an array of other pursuits. Copper, tin and lead played a 
key role in facilitating monetisation of the economy with 1–5 billion new bronze coins per year 
(as in 1021–80).158 This was a 37-fold increase from the Tang level (820 AD).159 To produce 1–
5 billion bronze coins a year required another 5–15 million worker-days,160 or 70,000–210,000 
households (counting one adult per household) working in the industry.161 The lion’s share of 
iron was used in shipbuilding and coin-minting (as a currency, tie qian). During the Northern 
Song, a cheap way to construct large sea-going ships, known as the ‘clinker method’, was 
developed which required a huge input of iron nails and rivets of high quality to hold planks 
together to make a hull.162 The Northern Song sea-going fleet maintained about 3,000 large 
cargo ships of 500–1,000 ton loading capacity each.163 These ships were vital for China’s 
foreign trade capacity. The Song river fleet boasted to own another 3,000 ships of 200-ton 
                                                 
152 Wagner, ‘Administration of the Iron Industry’, pp. 181–3. 
153 A larger centre rolled out over one million catties a year; see Wagner, Science and civilisation in 
China, pp. 295–8. 
154 Modern chemical analysis has revealed a high sulpha content in Song iron products as the evidence 
for the use of coal in smelting; see Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, Song Yuan Juan, p. 191. 
155 The Song administrative network for iron production covered 35 key locations across the Empire; see 
Xu, Song Huiyao Jigao, ‘Shihou 33/3–4’; Wagner, Science and civilisation in China, pp. 295–8. 
156 It has been estimated that the north-south output ratio was 1:6; see Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, p. 
610. 
157 For regional household numbers, see Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 129–35. 
158 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, p. 609. 
159 Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, Song Yuan Juan, p. 236. 
160 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 608–9. 
161 Based on 300–1,000 coins per worker per day; see Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, p. 615. 
162 Regarding iron nails and rivets for shipbuilding, see Deng, Chinese Maritime Sector, pp. 47–8; Qi, 
Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 681–8. Note: ship nails and rivets have to be made of pure iron to avoid 
erosion in sea water. 
163 Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development, pp. 68, 80; Deng, Maritime 
Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power, p. 12. 
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displacement to handle 300,000 tons of cargo each year along inland waterways.164 The river 
fleet was imperative for the Song market function and food supply to the north. Given that a 
traditional ship of the medium size (a 70-tonner) needed 100 m3 of wood planks and 5 metric 
tons of iron nails and rivets to build,165 the aggregate inputs in the Song shipbuilding were in 
the region of 5 million m3 of planks and a quarter of million tons of nails and rivets.166 
Regarding money supply, from circa 970 AD onwards, iron coins were mass-produced in the 
region of 400 million pieces (wen) a year, the largest amount made of iron in Chinese history 
hitherto, to maintain a dual track system together with bronze coins to tackle the growing 
hunger for liquidity in a commercial boom.167 Other common objects made of iron included 
weapons, statues, bridge-building (iron chains), musical instruments (e.g. gongs and cymbals), 
farming and handicraft tools (spades, ploughs, saws, chisels), and kitchen utensils (knives, pots 
and woks).168 Steel was produced from iron during the Northern Song, although its quantity is 
known.169 Iron sheets were also used to produce copper with an input-output ratio at 2.4:1 
called dantong fa, a novel method of extracting copper cheaply through a chemical agent (i.e. 
CuSO4·5H2O).170  
During the Northern Song, China’s ceramic production came a long way from the 
earthenware tang sancai type (Tang three-coloured earthenware) to the genuine water-proof 
porcelain made of the ‘kaolin clay’ (powder from rocks), baked for weeks on end at a 
temperature above 1200º C in kilns of a house size. Unlike the cottage-based earthenware-
making potteries, the new porcelain industry was a heavy industry which needed a minimum 
output to justify the investment sum. Northern Song had 28 porcelain production centres, 
although the size of the workforce has remained unknown.171  
There was a strong growth in construction. In Quanzhou (Zone B"), the main trading 
port for the Song Empire, about 290 bridges were constructed during the Northern Song.172 
They cost a total of one billion Song coins, coming mainly from the private sector.173 To build 
these bridges needed a minimum of 890,000 tons of granite slabs,174 or 4.4 tons of slabs per 
household in the prefecture of the time (as in 1078).175 To achieve that, sizeable quarrying, 
masonry and overland transport industries were vital.176 
                                                 
164 Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development, pp. 62, 66, 82. 
165 Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power, pp. 29, 31. 
166 Ibid., p. 27. 
167 Yan, Liangsong Tieqian, p. 403; for the historical context, see von Glahn, Fortune. 
168 Ebrey, Illustrated History, p. 144. 
169 There were three documented ways to make steel out of iron at the time; see Hu, Zhongguo 
Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, pp. 205–7. 
170 The annual copper production this way reached 380,000 catties a year. The iron input required was 
one million catties; see Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 567–8. 
171 Li, Zhongguo Gudai Jingjishi Gao, vol. 3, pp. 48–55; Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 690–700. 
172 Deng, Maritime Sector, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power, p. 27. 
173 Ibid., p. 39. Buddhists played a highly visible role in bridge construction as good deeds; see Fang, 
‘Songdai Sengtu Dui Zaoqiaode Gongxian’. 
174 Deng, Maritime Sector, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power, p. 38. 
175 Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, p. 131. 
176 Deng, Maritime Sector, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power, p. 39. 
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Regarding light industry, a boom appeared in paper manufacturing. In Zone B, eight 
prefectures were specialised in paper-making.177 Huizhou Prefecture (Zone B) and Xinan 
Prefecture (Zone A) alone were able to roll out annually 1.4 and 1.5 million sheets, 
respectively.178 Such a quantity was achieved by an organised workforce. A recent 
archeological discovery made in Fuyang (Zone B) reveals a sizeable paper workshop built in 
1009 AD with a floor area of 22,000 m2 with a daily pulp output capacity of 10 tons.179 Much 
of the paper outputs fuelled the growth in the printing industry for which the Northern Song 
was prominent in Chinese history.180 Large numbers of books were produced for prestige, 
profit, and bureaucrat recruitment via the Imperial Examinations.181 From 1080 to 1113, a total 
of 300 million characters were carved on 400,000 printing blocks in Fujian for the circulation of 
a Chinese translation of the Tripitaka.182 On the whole, 6,705 new book titles with 73,877 
volumes were registered as newly acquired items in the Song imperial collections.183 There was 
also regular circulation of official and semi-official newspapers (chaobao, dibao, and 
xiaobao).184 
There was the repertoire of household-based textile production to meet tax obligations, a 
tradition going back to the Tang.185 There was also an urban arm of the industry to produce 
mainly for the upper end of the market with an elaborate putting-out system. Urban 
professional weavers amounted for about 100,000 households, each producing 30 bolts a year, 
or three million bolts in total.186 
A growth also infected the service sector (including commerce) which was well 
documented. The evidence of fast commercialisation came from money supply. Bronze coins 
issued increased over six times:187 
 AD Output (106 coins) Metal inputs (106 catties) 
 995 800 4 (2,400 tons) 
 1080 5,060 25.3 (15,180 tons) 
 Annual growth % 2.2 2.2 
 
                                                 
177 Zheng, Tang Wudai Jiangnan Gongshangye Buju Yanjiu, pp. 206–7. 
178 Needham, Science and Civilisation, vol. 5, pt 1, p. 47; Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, 
Song Yuan Juan, p. 51. 
179 See http://xbh.zjol.com.cn/05xbh/system/2010/01/20. 
180 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 715–22. 
181 During the Song Period, the numbers of candidates received their Imperial Degrees a year was 5 
times of the previous Tang and 3.4 times of the Qing half a millennium later; see Yang, Songdai Chuban 
Wenhua, p. 47.  
182 Kang, Beisong Wenhua Zhongxin Yanjiu, p. 157.  
183 Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 202, ‘Yiwenzhi 155’. 
184 Kang, Beisong Wenhua Zhongxin Yanjiu, pp. 108–31. 
185 In theory, there were some 20 million households producing home-made textiles to pay their taxes; 
in reality only a tenth of them actually did it. See Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 
288–9. 
186 Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji Tongshi, Song Yuan Juan, p. 118. 
187 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 608–9.  
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From 1023 to 1107, the amount of paper currency issued increased 40 times, annually 
growing 4.5 per cent.188 A range of novel devices were first invented during the Northern 
Song, too, including written business contracts for risk reduction, jiaozi (bills of exchange) for 
business credit, huizi and qianyi (paper currency) for liquidity, not to mention the securities. 
In this context, it is easy to envisage the full force of the change encountered by the 
farming sector in a quasi-dualistic way. Staple food production now faced unprecedented 
competition from high value-adding cash crops (Table 5). 
Cash cropping and non-farming employment seemed winning the competition.189 
Anecdotally, in the Kaifeng region, the income generated from 10 mu of vegetable garden 
matched the income from 100 mu under food crops.190 According to a contemporary 
observation, 70 per cent of farms in parts of Zone C involved in sugarcane-growing and sugar-
processing, at the expense of rice.191 Tea was produced in 374 districts, across 15 provinces in 
Zones B and C. The annual output was 23–29 million catties (13,730–17,300 metric tons),192 
also at the expense of rice. Large tea plantations were reported in Chengdu Fu (Sichuan) with 
an annual output up to 50,000 catties each; in Fujian Lu, there were over 1,300 private 
workshops, specialised in tea-processing.193 Silk was produced in 123 districts in 21 provinces 
(in Zones A, B and C). Over 60 per cent raw silk and silk textiles came from Zone B, again at the 
expense of rice.194 The trade-off between silkworm-raising and rice-farming was well-
documented as follows:195 
 
In Ji-an [Zone B], many people live exclusively on raising silkworms. A household of 10 
people is able to raise 10 trays [bo] of worms. Each tray yields 12 catties of cocoons. 
Each catty of cocoons produces 1.3 liang of raw silk. Each 5 liang of such silk produce 
a bolt of plain cloth, worth 1.4 shi of rice. In doing so, both ends of the household are 
guaranteed to be met. 
 
Finally and inevitably, urban centres emerged. The capital city Kaifeng is believed to have 
had 1.5 million residents,196 while the urban proportion of the population has been estimated 
as between 12 and 20 per cent of the Song total.197 Although these figures are subject to 
                                                 
188  Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1087. This caused, as expected, a severe inflation. But this was a different matter. 
189 Cheng, Songdi Diyu Jingji, pp. 118–54; also Li, Tangdai Jiangnan Nongyede Fazhan, ch. 5; Qi, 
Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, ch. 4; Ji, Zhetang Shi, ch. 6.  
190 Cited in Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, p. 162. 
191 Wang, Tangshuang Pu.  
192 Zhu, ‘Songdai Chazhi Chanqu Jiqi Zhonglei Yu Chanliang’. 
193 Hau, Songshi Lunji, pp. 56, 58. 
194 Zhao, ‘Songdai Cansiyede Dili Fenbu’, pp. 587, 595. 
195 Chen, Chenfu Nongshu. One Song liang = 37.3 grams. 
196 Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, p. 574; Hu and Zhang, Zhongguo Renkou Dili, vol. 1, p. 249. 
197 Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 933, 948; Zhao, Zhongguo Chengshi Fazhanshi Lunj, p. 76. Wu, 
Zhongguo Renkoushi, p. 681. To feed urban people, 43 million shi of food (20 million metric tons) were 
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debate, by the end of the Northern Song, a dozen cities seemed to have had over 100,000 
households each.198 The growth was particularly strong in the south where Jizhou and 
Tanzhou surpassed Kaifeng (Table 6). This is not surprising given the political and economic 
freedom in Zone C. 
A general pattern emerges from the Northern Song changes and growth. Firstly, the 
economy experienced major restructuring and leaned more towards industry and services. 
Secondly, industry and commerce grew fast and the south performed better than the north due 
to climatic, geopolitical and institutional reasons. Thirdly, the farming sector did not aim to 
make food cheaper despite its spare capacity. Only a high market price for food, together with 
the availability of arable land and tax cuts, was able to persuaded and compensate those who 
kept on farming. Fourthly, in the process, resources were allocated by and through the market. 
The Song households now optimised incomes across different sectors instead of maximising 
their food output. Finally, the population grew continuously through these changes. Only an 
established market economy behaves this way. The Song Chinese could well be short-listed for 
the first group of Homo economicus in the world history. 
This pattern was most obvious in the south where the local population did not plump for 
a mono-product of grain despite the absolute advantages in doing so (including more suited 
climate, more arable land and a long way from external threat). Rather, metal production, trade 
and urbanisation flourished there. The local population grew, too. Such a change is compatible 
with the on-going ‘real wage debate’ in global history.199  
The findings of the causes, mechanisms and stance of the Song growth and development 
suggests that Eric Jones is right: ‘China came within a hair’s breath of industrialising’.200 
 
III 
 
This study argues that the unprecedented Song population spurt was fuelled by an 
economic restructuring-cum-growth. It is already clear from the prime facie evidence that 
annual growth rates of industry and services increased faster than that of the population. To 
test that further, this paper employs the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to regress a set of time 
series data to examine the impact of economic growth on the Song population (for data 
sources, see Appendix). The model in the log-linear version is structured as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                        
sold to cities and towns every year, enough to sustain one million households at the subsistence level. See 
Gao, ‘Lun Songdai Huobi Liutongzhongde Jige Guanxi’, p. 96. 
198 Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 79–80. 
199 The debate is all about differences in monetary costs for the same ‘utility function’ across different 
economies. Consumers pay more for the same level of consumption in a more advanced economy where 
wages are higher than a less advanced economy where wages are lower. Or, wages in a more advanced 
economy have less purchasing power than their counterpart in a less advanced economy in possessing 
the same basket of consumer goods. This is the basic principle of utilitarianism. It has been argued that 
such a divergence in wages leads to different investment strategies which in turn determine different 
growth trajectories. See e.g. Allen et al., Living Standards; Broadberry and Burhop, ‘Real Wages and 
Labor Productivity’. 
200 Jones, European Miracle, p. 160. 
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LHH = α + β1LAOUTPUT + β2LINCOME + β3LTAX + β4LRICEP + β5LSILKP + β6LWARDI + error      (1)  
Where the dependent variable is the total number of households (HH), serving as a proxy 
for the Song population. Three predictor variables are (1) total farming output to feed the 
population (AOUTPUT), (2) total non-agricultural incomes to maintain the population (INCOME), 
and (3) tax burden per household as an income reducer (TAX). In addition, three control 
variables are included for estimation. Rice and silk cloth were two common and relatively 
homogenous consumer items during the Northern Song. Their prices (RICEP and SILKP) are used 
as control variables to represent costs of living. The third control variable is disasters (WARDI), 
combining wars and natural calamities, to estimate shocks on population growth.  
It is expected that AOUTPUT and LINCOME are positively, and TAX, RICEP, SILKP and 
WARDI negatively, related to the growth in HH, ceteris paribus. The results generated from the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are listed in Table 7. The high values of adjusted R-squared imply 
that the independent variables in Equation (1) explain well and capture most of the variation in 
the dependent variable.  
The empirical results generated from Model 1 (Column 1) indicate that all the three 
predictor variables are important for the Song population growth (HH). The total farming 
output (AOUTPUT) and the total non-agricultural incomes (INCOME) both have positive and 
significant impact at a high level on the growth in household numbers. With one per cent 
increase in agricultural output and in non-agricultural incomes, households increase by 0.42 per 
cent and 0.39 per cent, respectively. This result supports our hypothesis that with economic 
restructuring agriculture and non-agriculture simultaneously supported the Song population 
growth like twine engines. As expected, tax burden per household (TAX) has negative impact 
on the population growth. One per cent deduction of tax burden increases households by 0.12 
per cent. It makes sense as the Song taxation burden was low from the beginning.  
The three control variables, living costs (LRICEP and LSILKP) and disasters (LWARDI) also 
have negative but weak influence on the population growth. The reason was that as economic 
prosperity increased population’s tolerance towards income deductions caused by living costs 
and disasters increased, too. This is not to say that disasters and wars were not important. The 
Little Ice Age was vital for the performance of the farming sector in the north (Zones A and E). 
But it directly affected only a third of the farmland of the Empire. Farmers could take up jobs in 
local non-farming sectors or move to the south. The nomad threat was vital for sharp changes 
in behaviour and policies of the state. But the policy of paying ransoms worked. More wars 
were avoided in a fragile geopolitical equilibrium, although the ransoms did not solve the 
problem of national security in the long run. 
Considering a potential bi-directional relationship from households to agricultural output 
and to non-agricultural income, more dynamic models are added to check robustness, i.e. the 
lagged LAOUTPUTlag1 (Model 2), lagged LINCOMElag1 (Model 3), lagged LAOUTPUTlag1 and 
LINCOMElag1 (Model 3). The results (Columns 2, 3, and 4) show high similarities to Model 1 
(Column 1), testifying a low risk of bi-directional causality in Model 1.  
 
 
IV 
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What this paper has achieved is to demystify the intricacies of the Song growth and 
development. It has revealed that the unprecedented population spurt during the Northern 
Song Period was not a result of a purposely introduced new rice species. Rather, it was a 
complicated story of shocks, economic restructuring and development, and subsequent 
population growth. In the process, industry and commerce grew faster than the one per cent 
population growth rate; farming for staple food matched the population growth, but only just. 
So, the Northern Song growth was neither ‘surplus-pulled’ nor ‘subsistence-pushed’ as 
commonly believed. Rather, this is predominantly a story of ‘demand-driven backward linkages’. 
The Northern Song paradox is all about spectacular incompetence in national security 
leading to epic economic prosperity. The prime mover for the Song growth and development 
was the mounting geopolitical pressure from nomads who decided to exert their military 
supremacy to milk cash and luxuries from the Northern Song economy. Such specific demand 
did two things to Song China. First, it created a pressing fiscal emergency for the Song state to 
amass the cash and luxuries. Second, to get cash and luxuries activated a dormant market 
economy as well as Chinese creativity. A chain reaction of backwards linkages soon began, 
leading to economic re-structuring. Here, the role of the state and the market orientation of the 
Song economy were both decided by the quality and quantity of the ransoms. There could be 
three other realistic scenarios: the nomads could have demanded, say, staple food and slaves 
instead; the Song state could have surrendered to the nomads at the beginning; and the Song 
military could have been overhauled and defeated the enemy. Any of them would have made 
the Song economic landscape look very different. 
All the time, the economic restructuring was a freestanding factor independent from the 
population increase.201 The Little Ice Age did little to transform the Song economic structure. 
At best, the climate change helped Song China reach an existing production possibility frontier 
with the diffusion of winter-wheat at the time when the Song farmers were fully able to 
produce enough food during the climate change without Champa Rice or even without winter-
wheat. Of course, the climate change caused the life in the Steppes to deteriorate. But it did 
not automatically justify nomads’ wars against China. During the Northern Song Period, arable 
land was abundant in all zones; and the monad population small. If enough nomads had had 
decided to be ‘sinicised’, immigrate, settle in and become farmers, as a great many Khitans did 
after 1127,202 the Song economic landscape would have looked very different, too. 
Consequently, with the economic restructuring, China’s production possibility frontier 
shifted outwards, exuberant non-farming sectors became increasingly significant in the 
economy, and individuals’ incomes increased and diversified. So, after deductions (e.g. taxation 
and securities), enough was left to be funnelled to support one per cent growth in population. 
This virtuous growth spiral was not intended when the Northern Song began in 960 AD.  
                                                 
201 This fundamentally contracts North and Thomas’ view on how better institutions were created under 
population pressure; see North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, ch. 3. 
202 The Khitan Jin boasted to have 6.15 million households and 1.69 million qing of farmland (as in 
1183); and its official policy of the Khitan Jin was stated as ‘tilling and weaving as the foundation of the 
economy’ (in 1189); see Tuo, Jin Shi, ‘Shihuo 1’. The Jin official land allocation was 100 mu for each poll-
taxpayer in a land abundant region, and 10 mu for each poll-taxpayer in a land scarce region; see Tuo, Jin 
Shi, ‘Shihuo 2’. Also see Deng, Chinese Premodern Economy, ch. 6. 
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Ideally, after demystifying the Song growth and development, this study should consider 
China’s national income, sectorial GDP growth,203 real wages and living standards.204 This 
requires a great deal of more statistical information that Song China does not offer.205 This sets 
the limits for this study. Clearly also, more in-depth research is still needed in regard to how the 
Song elite and general public managed to overcome the stubborn resistance to changes. Such 
resistance usually came from indoctrinated physiocracy, entrenched private property rights for 
the peasantry, deeply rooted discrimination against the artisan and merchant classes, and 
relative high costs of capital and labour-saving machines.  
In addition, we still do not know enough about how capital investment and re-
investment was made in industry and commerce especially by the private sector; nor do we 
have a clear idea of how a new cluster of useful and reliable knowledge/technology was 
patronised and diffused in society rapidly; nor do we understand how transaction costs were 
lowered for ordinary peasants to switch to different labour markets for industry and commerce. 
Moreover, although Song China responded successfully to exogenous shocks, the very 
fact that it took three demanding nomad groups to cause the economic restructuring to occur 
implies a lack of internal impetus in Chinese society in its ‘natural self’. Equally, the fact that the 
Song state was in the end unable to safe-guard China’s remarkable economic achievements 
points to the same problem. More work is needed in this area. 
Finally, more comparison will be very useful between Northern Song and other 
commercial economies in world history to see their differences and similarities. For example, 
how similar was the Song maritime expansion to the Indian Ocean as a response to the control 
of the Silk Road by nomads, compared with Western European maritime endeavour during the 
fifteenth to sixteenth centuries to outflank the Ottoman monopoly of oriental trade and reach 
the Asian market directly?  
If one really wishes to push the debate further, was Song China marked a ‘proto-Great 
Divergence’ by generating entirely independently advanced industry and commerce ahead of 
anyone else in the Old World of the time? Counterfactually, could it be possible for the Song 
growth to lead China to a fully fledged industrial revolution if the Mongol conquest had been 
absent? Or, why did the Northern Song saga end in the fashion of ‘killing the goose that lay 
golden eggs’? Why could the Mongols not be bribed like the Khitans, Tanguts and Jurchens by 
the richest economy in the Old World? And, could the Song success be passed on to the 
Mongols and then propagated itself across the rest of Eurasia? 
Now, the door for the study of the Northern Song case has opened even wider than ever 
before.
                                                 
203 For some pioneer works on China’s national income, see Ou, National income of China and Liu and 
Yeh, Economy of the Chinese Mainland, National Income and Economic Development, vol. 1, pp. 39, 94, 
207–8, 215, 250. For an earlier period, see Guan and Li, ‘Mingdai GDP Ji Jieguo Shitan’. Regarding 
incomes of the elite, see Chang, Income of the Chinese Gentry, p. 193. Chang, and Guan and Li followed 
Liu and Yeh in methodology. Regarding the agricultural income, Perkins used per capita food 
consumption, population size and farmland acreage; see his Agricultural Development in China. Perkins’ 
method was followed by Angus Maddison, see his Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. 
204 For recent attempts, see Broadberry et al., ‘China, Europe and the Great Divergence’; Edwards, 
‘Redefining Industrial Revolution: Song China and England’, pp. 20–3. 
205 For the recent debate, see Du and Li, ‘Zhongguo Jingjishi GDP Yanjiuzhi Wuqu’. 
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Appendix 
The time series examined cover the period from 997 to 1111 due to data availability. The 
time series has 38/39 observation points with intervals of three years apart. All the prices are 
converted to a 997 constant price when applicable.206 The original data are often patchy, but 
well spread out across the 997–1111 period. The missing data are linearly interpolated and, 
only occasionally, extrapolated.  
 Regarding the dependent variable (HH), there are 18 entries directly from historical 
sources. We use two compilations of historical records: Liang’s Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi 
Tianfu Tongji and Wu’s Zhongguo Renkoushi. The value of the total farming output (AOUTPUT) 
is obtained from the total farmland multiplied by the average yield level per mu. The data for 
farmland come from the Song cadastral surveys in 996, 1021, 1067 and 1083, cited in Tuo’s 
Song Shi (vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’), Liang’s Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, Qi’s 
Songdai Jingjishi and Cheng’s Songdai Diyu Jingji. The yield level is region-weighted as 
discussed earlier (i.e. 1.7 Song shi per Song mu before circa 1000 AD and 2.2 Song shi per Song 
mu after 1000 AD). This range is very modest.207 Modern estimates of Song farmland are not 
used due to their tendency to assume that the Song acreage went up all the time, simply untrue 
in reality. Moreover, those estimates are overwhelmingly derived from the Song population per 
se,208 an approach that is highly vulnerable to endogeneity. 
 The value of non-agricultural incomes (INCOME) is derived from the commercial tax rate 
(5 per cent) and the government non-agricultural tax revenues. Eight government fiscal reports 
are available (for 996, 1021, 1058, 1063, 1065, 1069, 1078, and 1086). Our sources are 
Liang’s Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji. Regarding the tax rate, we use Tuo’s Song 
Shi (vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’, and vol. 186, ‘Shihuozhi 139’), Wang’s Liangsong Caizheng Shi, 
Li’s ‘Luexi Songdai Guanshizhi Zheng’, and Guo’s Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji 
Kaolue. Undoubtedly, extra revenue could be extracted if the taxman collected more than five 
per cent of goods’ value. On the other hand, Zone D was tax-free, and tax evasion was 
widespread in other zones, which led to the radical reforms of Wang Anshi (1021–86). So, over-
taxation and tax aversion/haven could cancel each other to a great extent. 
The value of tax burden per household (TAX) is calculated from tax payments in goods 
and cash, divided by the total households. Apart from the eight entries for the government 
non-agricultural revenues in cash, there are six official figures for agricultural revenues collected 
in foods (996, 1021, 1063, 1065, 1078, and 1086), and another six in silk (996, 1021, 1063, 
1065, 1078, and 1086). Our sources are Liang’s Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji and 
Wang’s Liangsong Caizheng Shi. Food and silk are then converted to the period market value 
                                                 
206 Price conversion is based on Peng, Zhongguo Huobi Shi, p. 505; Guo, ‘Songchaode Wujia Biandong 
Yu Jizang Lunzui’, p. 72; Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 1104–7. For multiple currencies and exchange 
rates, see Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 287–321, 331. 
207 Note: During the Ming-Qing Period (1368–1911), the same nominal output levels, i.e. 1–2 shi per mu, 
were cited; see Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 209; Li, Duoshijiao Kan Jiangnan Jingjishi, pp. 298–9; 
Wu, Zhongguo Jingjishi Ruogan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu, pp. 142–4; Shi, ‘Shijiu Shiji Shangbanqide 
Zhongguo Liangshi Muchanliang Ji Zongchanliang Zaiguji’, pp. 57, 61. But one Qing shi per Qing mu = 
1.6 Song shi per Song mu. 
208 Qi Xia’s estimate is 720 million mu for 1110; see his Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 1, pp. 59–60. If true, the 
entire Song workforce would have to do one thing only: to farm. And food would have become much 
cheaper. Qi clearly mistook the Song for the Ming-Qing. 
 33 
for uniformity. The food and silk prices come from Cheng’s Songdai Wujia Yanjiu and Yu’s 
Zhongguo Jiage Shi. 
Information of prices of rice and silk for living costs (RICEP, SILKP) comes from Cheng’s 
Songdai Wujia Yanjiu, Guo’s ‘Songchaode Wujia Biandong Yu Jizang Lunzui’, and Yu’s 
Zhongguo Jiage Shi. In all, 16 rice prices are collected (996, 1003, 1009, 1029, 1042, 1053, 
1069, 1075, 1080, 1086, 1088, 1094, 1099, 1108, and 1110). Ten silk prices are obtainable 
(1000, 1016, 1046, 1063, 1070, 1079, 1086, 1101, 1103 and 1107). All the information is 
from anecdotes, not market surveys; but it is as good as one can probably get. 
Data for wars and natural disasters (WARDI) are derived from various records. Floods, 
storms, locust outbreaks, and communicable plagues are used as proxies for natural disasters. 
Our sources are Fu et al.’s Zhongguo Junshi Shi, Lidai Zhanzheng Nianbiao, Xia and Song et al.’s 
Zhongguo Gudai Ziran Zaiyi Dongtao Fenxi. 
The final line-up is in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Time-Series Dataset 
 
Year Households A-output Non A-income Tax R-price S-price W/D 
 
997 
1000 
1003 
1006 
1009 
1012 
1015 
1018 
1021 
1024 
1027 
1030 
1033 
1036 
1039 
1042 
1045 
1048 
1051 
1054 
1057 
1060 
1063 
1066 
1069 
1072 
1075 
1078 
1081 
1084 
1087 
1090 
1093 
1096 
1099 
1102 
1105 
1108 
1111 
 
 
4574257 
5719209 
6864160 
7417570 
8402537 
8412470 
8422403 
8545276 
8677677 
9898121 
10030405 
10162689 
10296565 
10663027 
10179989 
10307640 
10682947 
10723695 
10747954 
10792705 
10825580 
11091112 
12462317 
14181485 
14414043 
15091560 
15684529 
16402631 
16730504 
17211713 
17957092 
18655093 
19120921 
19435570 
19715555 
20264307 
20456273 
20648238 
20882258 
 
 
531292712.5 
561000000 
794942937.8 
845956630.2 
900244017.2 
959868841.8 
1019493666 
1107645339 
1154527950 
1145716209 
1132699506 
1119682802 
1098440741 
1085889435 
1077601675 
1065288486 
1053115991 
1041082588 
1033136804 
1021331689 
1001955497 
990506677.6 
982946899 
968000000 
973830886.6 
982643140.6 
991535135.8 
1000507596 
1006534296 
1015642320 
1037695870 
1075521066 
1098874819 
1122735673 
1138930058 
1163660667 
1189202604 
1214744538 
1232236729 
 
 
2.4E+11 
2.64984E+11 
2.92568E+11 
3.23025E+11 
3.56651E+11 
3.9378E+11 
4.3477E+11 
4.80029E+11 
5.3E+11 
5.44702E+11 
5.59813E+11 
5.75342E+11 
5.91302E+11 
6.07705E+11 
6.24563E+11 
6.41889E+11 
6.59695E+11 
6.77996E+11 
6.96803E+11 
7.16133E+11 
7.36E+11 
7.96991E+11 
8.63037E+11 
9.34555E+11 
1.012E+12 
1.04708E+12 
1.08338E+12 
1.12094E+12 
1.15979E+12 
1.2E+12 
9.6E+11 
9.68607E+11 
9.77291E+11 
9.86054E+11 
9.94894E+11 
1.00381E+12 
1.01281E+12 
1.02189E+12 
1.03106E+12 
 
 
3457.22267 
2828.411036 
2409.373136 
2275.00168 
2050.420468 
2093.327858 
2136.133886 
2170.090024 
2170.465091 
1863.031732 
1790.953432 
1720.751436 
1646.211746 
1569.919802 
1859.466838 
2334.660459 
3073.791938 
2564.027214 
2320.899075 
2062.041732 
4832.942321 
4791.557818 
4314.032491 
4160.036419 
4123.493713 
2175.776882 
1272.13729 
832.7358763 
804.9506367 
782.5216653 
3193.425194 
2004.352768 
1587.31024 
1326.963131 
1207.070243 
1085.88359 
1065.377429 
1045.252609 
1060.446705 
 
 
300 
475 
650 
515 
380 
415 
450 
503 
533 
563 
615 
667 
745 
794 
829 
885 
978 
1080 
1154 
1275 
1093 
997 
938 
829 
780 
990 
1200 
1633 
2067 
1344 
620 
865 
870 
815 
760 
980 
1090 
1200 
1200 
 
 
1013 
971 
929 
895 
862 
831 
800 
954 
1042 
1138 
1310 
1482 
1848 
2109 
2303 
2629 
3000 
2565 
2310 
1975 
1520 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1300 
1550 
1800 
1588 
1473 
1367 
1300 
1400 
1450 
1500 
2000 
 
 
248 
0 
55 
29 
33 
0 
50 
28 
10 
6 
0 
30 
20 
10 
6 
12 
20 
13 
5 
13 
31 
10 
6 
5 
21 
17 
37 
34 
7 
27 
23 
12 
12 
11 
13 
11 
0 
24 
2 
 
 
Note: The original data available are fragmentary with gaps in between. Such gaps are filled with figures 
derived from the existing data with a linear growth rate. A-output = Agricultural output; Non A-income = 
non-agricultural income; R-price = Rice price; S-price = Silk cloth price; W/D = Wars and natural disasters. 
Source: See the body of text in Appendix.
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Figure 1. Song Eco-Economic Zones, River Systems and Sea Ports 
 
 
 
Note: A, B, D and E – mainly temperate; D – subtropical; B' (Chengdu Fu) and B" (Liangzhe and Fujian Lu) 
shared a similar farming pattern with B. The territorial sizes of those zones were not identical with their 
farmland sizes. Sea ports are marked by crosses. 
Source: Tan, Jiangming Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji, pp. 41–2, 51–4; Qi, ‘Songdai Shehui Shengchanlide 
Fazhan Jiqizai Zhongguo Gudai Jingji Fazhan Guochengzhongde Diwei’, pp. 43–5; Liang, Zhongguo Lidai 
Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 164. 
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Figure 2. Geopolitical Map of Song China  
 
 
 
Note: Along the northern border were the Khitan Kingdom (Liao) and the Tangut 
Kingdom (Xixia) prior to 1127. The grey line = new international border between the 
Jurchen Jin and the Southern Song after 1127. GW = the line where the old Great Wall 
had laid. Numbers represent provinces (lu), as in 1111 AD. Kaifeng was the capital of 
the Northern Song; Lin-an, that of the Southern Song.  
Source: Based on Tan, Jiangming Zhongguo Lishi Ditu Ji, pp. 51–4.  
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Table 1. Official Registered Numbers of Households, 1003–1100  
 
 Households Index Poll-taxpayers Index 
1003* 6,864,160 100 14,278,040 100 
1020 9,716,716 142 22,717,272 159 
1042* 10,307,640 150 22,926,101 161 
1061* 11,091,112 162 22,683,112 159 
1080 16,730,504 244 23,830,781 167 
1100 19,960,812 291 44,914,991 316 
Annual %  1.1  1.2 
 
Note: * The closest observation points available at the beginning of a decade. 
 
Source: Based on Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 122–4; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoshi, 
pp. 346–8. 
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Table 2. Fluctuations in Farmland vs. Growth in Household Numbers, 1021–85 
 Farmland (105 qing) Index Households (106) Index 
1021 52.5 100 8.7 100 
1054 22.8 43 10.8 124 
1065 44.0 84 12.9 148 
1085 24.8 47 18.0* 207 
Average  36.0  12.6 
 
Note: * Year 1086 figure. One qing = 100 mu. 
 
Sources: Data for farmland, based on Tuo, Song Shi, vol. 173, ‘Shihuozhi 126’. Data for households, 
based on Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 122–4; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, p. 
346–7. 
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Table 3. Urban Commercial Tax-Paying Shares, 1077 (106 coins) 
 
Zone Urban 
centres 
Revenue Tax % (I) RHS % (II) I/II 
A 48 1,376.6 42.2 23.6 1.8 
B 49 1,263.0 38.8 41.1 0.9 
C 20 391.1 12.0 19.4 0.6 
D – – – 8.3 – 
E 10 228.6 7.0 7.5 0.9 
Total 127 3,259.3 100.0 100.0 1.0 
 
Note: RHS – Regional Household Shares in China’s Total.  
 
Source: Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 223–8; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, 
pp. 122–35; Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, p. 164. 
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Table 4. Growth in Metal Outputs (in Catties), 727–1077 
 
 
AD Iron Copper* Tin Lead 
727† 2,070,000 - - - 
997§ – 4,122,000 269,000 793,000 
1077/8§ 28,500,000¶ 21,744,750 6,159,300 7,943,350 
Annual growth %     
727–1077/8 0.8‡ - - - 
997–1077/8 - 2.1 4.0 2.9 
 
Note: One Tang/Song catty = 0.6 kg. * Large quantities of copper were also produced from iron sheet 
with sulphuric acid. † Tang government taxable iron output, used here as a benchmark. § Song 
government procurements only, hence the minimum. ¶ Based on (1) 5.7 million catties received by the 
state (or 3,400 metric tons) in 1078 and (2) the compulsory erba choufen scheme of 20:80 output-
sharing between the state and the producer. ‡ The growth rate of household numbers from 726 AD to 
1077 AD was only 0.2 per cent per year in comparison.209  
 
Source: Iron, based on Qi, Songdai Jingjishi, vol. 2, pp. 586–92; Hu, Zhongguo Shougongye Jingji 
Tongshi, pp. 149–50. Other metals, based on Ma, Wenxian Tongkao, vol. 18, Entry ‘Mining’; Du, ‘Tang 
Song Jingji Shili Bijiao Yanjiu’, p. 44. Tang output, based on Ouyang, Xin Tangshu, vol. 54, ‘Shihuozhi’.  
 
                                                 
209 For the household numbers, see Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 6, 124. 
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Table 5. Crop Choices during Song Times 
 
 Calendar Month Growth cycle (days) 
Food crops 
 
  
Winter-wheat* 9th – 3rd (the following year) 175 
Millet 2nd – 7th 145 
Rice α† 3rd – 5th 58 
Rice β† 3rd – 7th 116 
Buckwheat§/Rice γ† 4th – 9th 145 
Cash crops 
 
  
Hemp 1st – 6th 145 
Sugarcane§ 2nd – 10th 230 
Early sesame 3rd – 7th 116 
Early legume 4th – 7th 87 
Late sesame 5th – 9th 116 
Vegetables 3rd – 10th 201 
Tea, fruits, mulberry trees 3rd – 10th 201 
   
 
Note: A Chinese calendar month has 29 days. Rice α–γ = rice choices; their sowing timing did not allow 
two rice crops within the same calendar year. * Suited for Zones A, B (including B' and B") and E. † 
Suited for Zones B, C and D. § Sugarcane is perennial and requires re-planting once every three years.  
Source: Chen, Chenfu Nongshu, pp. 2–5; Wang, Tangshuang Pu; Guo, Liansong Chengxiang Shangpin 
Huobi Jingji Kaolue, pp. 258, 264–8; Liang, Nansongde Nongcun Jingji, p. 117; Cheng, Songdai Diyu 
Jingji, pp. 98–100. 
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Table 6. Households’ Growth in Five Most Populated Prefectures, 980–1102  
 
 Zone 980 Index 1102 Index 
Kaifeng A 178,631 100 261,117 146 
Quanzhou B 96,581 100 201,406 209 
Fuzhou B 94,470 100 211,552 224 
Jizhou C 126,453 100 335,710 265 
Tanzhou C 52,906 100 439,988 832 
 
Source: Based on Liang, Zhongguo Lidai Huko Tiandi Tianfu Tongji, pp. 132–60; Hu and Zhang, 
Demographic Geography, vol. 1, p. 249; Wu, Zhongguo Renkoushi, pp. 574, 584. 
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Table 7. Empirical Results 
     
 Model 1 
(1) 
Model 2 
(2) 
Model 3 
(3) 
Model 4 
(4) 
Agricultural output 
(LAOUTPUT) 
0.42 
(0.06)*** 
 
 
0.44 
(0.06)*** 
 
Lagged agricultural output 
(LAOUTPUTlag1) 
 0.44 
(0.05)*** 
 0.42 
(0.05)*** 
Non agricultural incomes 
(LINCOME) 
0.39 
(0.09)*** 
0.39 
(0.07)*** 
  
Lagged non agricultural 
incomes (LINCOMElag1) 
  0.33 
(0.07)*** 
0.37 
(0.06)*** 
Tax (LTAX)  -0.12 
(0.02)*** 
-0.11 
(0.02)*** 
-0.11 
(0.02)*** 
-0.11 
(0.02)*** 
Rice price (LRICEP) -0.15 
(0.05)** 
-0.22 
(0.04)*** 
-0.14 
(0.04)*** 
-0.19 
(0.04)*** 
Silk price (LSILKP)  -0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.04)** 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
Disaster (LWARDI) -0.03 
(0.01)* 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Obs 39 38 38 38 
Adj R-sq 
 
0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively.  
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